Swinburne’s Substance Dualism
Christian philosopher Richard Swinburne is a leading advocate of substance dualism. “If you want to tell the whole story of the world, you must say what objects there are in the world, what substances there are, and what properties they have at different times,” Swinburne said on Closer to Truth. “Of course, that will include all the physical objects, all the tables and chairs and planets and atoms.”
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Richard Swinburne
Philosopher
Richard Swinburne is an English philosopher, Emeritus Nolloth Professor of the Philosophy of the Christian Religion at the University of Oxford. He has been a leading proponent of philosophical arguments for the existence and nature of God. His influential books include The Coherence of Theism, The Existence of God, and Faith and Reason. He has contributed to reviving substance dualism.
Key Takeaways
Core Claim
Every person has a nonphysical soul that is essential to personal identity and conscious life.
How It Works
The soul is a separate mental entity, distinct from but associated with a physical body and brain.
Distinguishing Idea
Physical facts alone can’t determine “who is who”; souls uniquely track personal identity through time.
Identity Argument
Swapping bodies wouldn’t swap “you” and “me,” proving identity depends on souls, not just physical form.
Non-Theological Basis
Swinburne argues for the soul using philosophical reasoning, independent of religious texts or beliefs.
Swinburne’s Substance Dualism
Christian philosopher Richard Swinburne is a leading advocate of substance dualism (Swinburne, 2013). "If you want to tell the whole story of the world, you must say what objects there are in the world, what substances there are, and what properties they have at different times," Swinburne said on Closer to Truth. "Of course, that will include all the physical objects, all the tables and chairs and planets and atoms. But, of course, that won't tell the whole story. You will also have to tell the story of conscious life, which is associated with each body."
Swinburne asserts that in order to tell "the whole story of the world," one must "pick out subjects of experience—not just by the experiences they have, not just by the physical bodies with which they are associated" but also with "separate mental entities for which the natural word is 'soul' … If you can't bring 'soul' into the account of the world, you will not tell the whole story of the world, because you will not tell who has which conscious life" (Swinburne, 2007; Swinburne, 2006).
Soul and the Whole Story
"If the only things were physical objects, including bodies and brains, we would not be able to distinguish a case where you have the body which is presently yours and I have the body which is presently mine, from the case where you have the body which is presently mine and I have the body which is presently yours," he adds. "If physical properties and mental properties were just properties of bodies there would be no difference between these cases; " but because there are obvious differences between "you" and "me," Swinburne claims that "there must be another essential part of me which goes where I go, and this we can call my 'soul.'" Truths about persons, Swinburne stresses, are not truths about brains or bodies (Swinburne, 2007).
Personal Identity and Independence from Theology
Swinburne's argument for the existence of a soul—that "souls constitute personal identity and the continued existence of me will consist in the continued existence of my soul"—"is quite apart from what might happen in the world to come." Moreover, Swinburne's arguments for the reality of a nonphysical soul do not depend, he says, on theological revelation or his own religious convictions (Swinburne, 2016; Kuhn 2016b).
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