Solms’s Affect as the Hidden Spring of Consciousness
Neuropsychologist and psychoanalyst Mark Solms argues that phenomenal consciousness is fundamentally affect—felt, valenced homeostatic need—generated not by the cerebral cortex but by the upper brainstem: the reticular activating system and periaqueductal grey, operating within a midbrain decision triangle. Citing hydranencephalic children, decorticate animals, patients lacking insular, prefrontal, or cingulate cortex, and the coma produced by minute brainstem lesions, he holds that the cortex is unconscious in itself and contributes the stabilized contents that contextualize feeling. Using Friston’s free energy principle, he identifies consciousness with precision optimization—felt uncertainty in prioritizing competing needs—and, as a dual-aspect monist, claims that this answers the hard problem and makes artificial consciousness possible in principle.

Mark Solms
Psychoanalyst & Neuropsychologist
Mark Solms (b. 1961, Namibia) is a South African neuropsychologist and psychoanalyst best known for identifying the brain mechanisms of dreaming and for founding the field of neuropsychoanalysis. He is Director of Neuropsychology at the Neuroscience Institute, University of Cape Town. Educated at the University of the Witwatersrand, he trained at the Institute of Psychoanalysis in London before returning to South Africa in 2002. He identified the forebrain mechanisms of dreaming, founded the International Neuropsychoanalysis Society, and is the authorized editor and translator of the Revised Standard Edition of Freud’s Complete Psychological Works (2024). His books include The Hidden Spring (2021) and The Only Cure (2026).
Key Takeaways
Core Claim
Consciousness is fundamentally affective; it begins with feelings rooted in homeostasis.
How It Works
The brainstem tracks bodily needs; affective states signal prediction errors in survival terms.
Distinguishing Idea
Feelings, not thoughts, are the original form of consciousness—subjectivity begins with affect.
Implications
Consciousness exists to help organisms flexibly meet needs in unpredictable environments.
Challenges AI
Only systems with real survival needs and affective inference could ever be truly conscious.
Solms’s Affect as the Hidden Spring of Consciousness
Neuropsychologist and psychoanalyst Mark Solms holds that phenomenal consciousness is, at root, affect: the felt, valenced registration of an organism’s own homeostatic needs, which arises in the upper brainstem and not in the cerebral cortex. On his account, the reticular activating system and the periaqueductal grey, working within a “midbrain decision triangle,” prioritize competing needs and generate the feeling by which an organism steers voluntary action under uncertainty, while the cortex, unconscious in itself, supplies the stabilized perceptual and cognitive contents that give feeling its context. Combining the affective neuroscience of Panksepp, Damasio, and Merker with Friston’s free energy principle, Solms identifies consciousness formally with precision optimization, or “felt uncertainty,” in self-organizing systems that must rank categorically distinct needs in unpredicted situations. Free energy minimization (in unpredicted contexts) is operationalized “where decreases and increases in expected uncertainty are felt as pleasure and unpleasure, respectively.” He offers reasons “why such existential imperatives feel like something to and for an organism.” He presents the result as a dual-aspect monist yet physicalist response to the hard problem, whose decisive test would be the engineering of an artificially conscious system (Solms & Friston, 2018; Solms, 2019, 2021a, 2021b, 2026).
The Cortical Fallacy
Solms adopts Zeman’s (2001) distinction between consciousness as the waking state and consciousness as experience, which corresponds to the neurological distinction between level and contents. The view he calls the cortical fallacy assigns the first to the brainstem and the second exclusively to the cortex, so that the brainstem merely switches on an experience generated elsewhere. He directs the charge at any theory that makes cortex necessary for experience: global workspace, thalamocortical integration, and gamma-synchrony theories, higher-order theories that require prefrontal cortex, and accounts that locate the feeling self in the insula (Solms, 2021a).
He traces the assumption to philosophical inheritance and not to evidence. Nineteenth-century neurologists, above all Meynert, located the empiricists’ memory images in the cortex and classed subcortical pathways as reflex. When Goltz’s decorticate dogs stayed wakeful and responsive but lost acquired knowledge, the result was read as confirming the theory.
The standard defense invokes blindsight, in which patients without visual cortex respond to visual stimuli while denying visual experience; this is taken to show that brainstem processing is unconscious and that responsiveness can dissociate from experience. Solms accepts the findings but rejects the generalization. Clinical neurology infers consciousness from responsiveness, and the burden of proof therefore lies with those who deny experience to beings who are awake, emotionally responsive, and capable of initiative (Solms, 2021a).
Evidence That the Cortex Is Not Necessary
Solms’s case rests on the clinical-anatomical principle that if a structure performs a function, complete destruction of the structure must abolish the function. The cortex, he argues, fails this test for phenomenal consciousness and the upper brainstem passes it (Solms, 2021a, 2021b).
The first line of evidence is hydranencephaly, in which the cerebral hemispheres are destroyed in utero and replaced by cerebrospinal fluid. Drawing on Merker (2007) and Shewmon et al. (1999), Solms notes that these children are not vegetative: they are awake and alert, smile and laugh, respond preferentially to familiar people, toys, and tunes, and sometimes show initiative, for example by operating switches to activate favored toys. They also suffer absence seizures, which caregivers recognize as lapses and returns of the child’s presence. Solms’s interpretation is that such children have affective consciousness without the cortical images that would let them know what their feelings are about.
The second is experimental decortication. Mammals whose cortex is removed neonatally are neither comatose nor vegetative. Decorticate rats groom, play, defend themselves, mate, and raise pups, and are if anything more active and emotionally reactive than intact animals (Panksepp, 1998; Merker, 2007).
The third is human cortical resection. Penfield and Jasper (1954), reporting extensive excisions, including hemispherectomies, under local anesthesia, found that removing cortex did not interrupt the patient’s reported consciousness even as it occurred; resection removed particular kinds of information, not sentient being.
The fourth addresses the regions proposed as the seat of the sentient self. For the insula, held by Craig (2009) to generate the feelings that constitute self-awareness, Solms cites Patient B of Damasio et al. (2013), whose insular cortices were destroyed bilaterally by herpes simplex encephalitis and who, over 27 years of study, reported and displayed the full range of bodily and emotional feelings and asserted a sense of self. For the prefrontal cortex, which higher-order theories take to be required for awareness of mental states, feelings included (LeDoux & Brown, 2017), he presents his own Patient W, whose prefrontal lobes were destroyed bilaterally in adolescence and who, decades later, was fully responsive, affirmed awareness of his own thoughts, and performed a mental-imagery task. For the anterior cingulate, he cites cingulectomy cases (Whitty & Lewin, 1957) and a patient of his own in whom bilateral lesions blurred the boundary between thought and perception but left a reporting, experiencing “I.” His conclusion is not that consciousness is normal after such lesions but that the conscious subject is not generated in any of these regions.
The fifth is that cortical processing is not intrinsically conscious. Amnesic patients learn without recollection, split-brain patients react emotionally to stimuli their verbal hemisphere cannot report, and subliminally presented words bias later preferences. Solms infers that the cortex can do unconsciously what it does consciously, and adds what he regards as a major clue: in each case what remained conscious was the feeling, while its cognitive source was unconscious. Feeling, he argues, is the one mental function that cannot occur unconsciously.
The converse evidence concerns the brainstem. Moruzzi and Magoun (1949) showed that small lesions disconnecting the cortex from the reticular core abolish consciousness in cats, and Fischer et al. (2016) localized a coma-specific region in the human rostral pontine tegmentum, which Solms describes as about two cubic millimeters in extent. Lesions of the periaqueductal grey, he notes, abolish intentional behavior and emotional responsiveness with less tissue destruction than at any other brain site (Panksepp, 1998).
The Brainstem Source: Arousal as Affect
The mainstream reply is that the reticular activating system is necessary for consciousness as a power supply is necessary for a television: it enables experience without contributing to it. Solms argues that the qualitative effects of manipulating the brainstem refute this. Deep brain stimulation of the substantia nigra in a patient with Parkinson’s disease produced, within seconds, profound despair that lifted shortly after stimulation ceased (Bejjani et al., 1999). The principal psychiatric medications act on neuromodulatory systems sourced in the reticular core, and functional imaging of strong emotional states shows maximal activation in subcortical structures with cortical deactivation. The structures necessary for consciousness as a whole are thus, in his view, the structures that generate affect (Solms, 2021a, 2021b).
He therefore rejects “level” and “wakefulness” as names for the brainstem’s contribution and uses “arousal,” understood as intrinsically qualitative. Physiologically, arousal is neuromodulation: diffuse, graded adjustment of the gain of forebrain neurons, which sets the global state in which targeted synaptic transmission occurs. Cortical activity becomes conscious only insofar as it is modulated from below. He distinguishes vegetative wakefulness, the autonomic sleep–wake cycle that persists in the vegetative state, from affective arousal, which brings emotional responsiveness and intentionality. The upper brainstem, he concludes, is intrinsically conscious and the cortex is not; the cortex derives its consciousness from the brainstem (Solms, 2013, 2021a).
The Midbrain Decision Triangle and the Role of the Cortex
Solms locates the transition from automatic regulation to felt experience in the periaqueductal grey (PAG), on which, following Panksepp, all the brain’s affective circuits converge. Because an organism can do only one or two things at a time, the error signals from its many need-regulating systems must be ranked, and the PAG ranks them in light of current opportunities, represented in sensorimotor maps in the adjacent superior colliculi. With the midbrain locomotor region, these form Merker’s selection triangle, which Solms renames the “midbrain decision triangle.” The winning need is felt; the others are handled automatically (Merker, 2007; Solms, 2021a). Since this architecture is common to all vertebrates, Solms attributes affective consciousness to vertebrates generally, and later allows that some invertebrates may qualify (Solms, 2026).
The cortex is thus indispensable to the form of human experience without being its source. The forebrain holds the organism’s generative model: long-term memories that function as predictions about how needs can be met. Cortical perception is an inference built from this model and corrected by sensory error, yielding the stable, object-filled scene Solms calls “mental solids.” Perceptual consciousness, unlike affective consciousness, requires suitably aroused cortex. Perception and cognition become conscious only insofar as they contextualize affect: experience has the structure of feeling a certain way about something.
The cortex’s specific contribution is to stabilize feeling and hold it in mind while an unpredicted problem is worked through. A cortical memory trace becomes conscious when arousal renders it labile for updating, and returns to unconsciousness once the revised prediction is reliable (Solms, 2021a, 2026).
Why Feeling Exists: Needs, Homeostasis, and Qualia
Solms explains that “complex organisms have multiple needs, each of which must be met in its own right, and, indeed, on a context-dependent basis, they cannot be reduced to a common denominator. For example … fear trumps sleepiness in some contexts but not in others.” So, he says, the needs of complex organisms like ourselves must be coded as categorical variables, which are distinguished qualitatively, not quantitatively. Thirst feels different from sleepiness feels different from separation distress feels different from fear, etc., such that their combined optimized resolution must be computed in a context-dependent fashion, which would lead to “excessively complex calculations,” a “combinatorial explosion.”
In terms of time spent and energy expended, the invention of affect, emotion, feeling is a much more efficient algorithm. Moreover, Solms adds, since “the needs of complex organisms which can act differentially, in flexible ways, in variable contexts, are ‘color-coded’ or ‘flavored,’ this provides at least one mechanistic imperative for qualia” (Solms, 2021a, 2021b).
Objectivity and subjectivity are observational perspectives, he says, not causes and effects. “Neurophysiological events can no more produce psychological events than lightning can produce thunder. They are dual manifestations of a single underlying process. The cause of both lightning and thunder is electrical discharge, the lawful action of which explains them both. Physiological and psychological phenomena must likewise be reduced to unitary causes, not to one another. This is merely a restatement of a well-known position on the mind–body problem: that of dual-aspect monism” (Solms, 2021b).[1]
Organisms must keep many variables within viable bounds; deviations are needs. Most needs are regulated automatically and never become conscious. A need becomes an affect when it is prioritized and felt, and it is felt as valenced: movement away from a settling point is unpleasure, movement toward it pleasure. Following Panksepp, Solms recognizes bodily affects and seven instinctual emotional systems. The biological function of consciousness is to guide voluntary behavior in situations for which the organism has no ready-made solution: it feels its way through the problem (Solms, 2021a).
Two arguments connect this function to phenomenal character. First, feeling cannot be unconscious, both by definition and because only felt needs govern voluntary action. Colors might be inverted without behavioral consequence, but fear and separation distress could not, since each feeling is inseparable from the action it compels. Nagel (2021) singles out this inseparability of affective phenomenology and function as an important insight. Second, affects differ in quality and not merely in magnitude because an organism’s needs cannot be reduced to a common denominator: each must be met in its own right, and their relative urgency changes with context. Such needs must be treated as categorical variables, which are distinguished qualitatively. Thirst therefore feels different from fear. Solms offers this as a mechanistic rationale for qualia, affective qualia being the elementary form of all qualia (Solms, 2019, 2021a, 2026).
Precision Optimization and Felt Uncertainty
The formal part of the theory, developed with Karl Friston, treats organisms as self-organizing systems that persist by minimizing variational free energy. Such a system is separated from its surroundings by a Markov blanket,[2] and its internal states embody a generative model of the causes of its sensations. Solms takes this to supply a minimal, non-conscious form of selfhood and value (Friston, 2013; Solms & Friston, 2018).
Such a system can reduce prediction error by acting to change its sensory input, by revising its predictions, or by adjusting the precision, or confidence, assigned to its predictions and to incoming error signals. Solms and Friston identify consciousness with the third. Precision weighting determines which error signals are allowed to revise the model; neurally, it is the neuromodulatory gain control that physiologists call arousal. Fluctuations in the system’s confidence that its prioritized need is being met are experienced as affect, with decreasing uncertainty felt as pleasure and increasing uncertainty as unpleasure (Solms, 2019); precision-weighted deviations from expected sensory states are experienced as exteroceptive qualia. All consciousness is thus “felt uncertainty” (Solms, 2021a, 2021b).
Solms is explicit that the step from this third-person description to experience requires adopting the perspective of the system itself. A self-organizing system obliged to prioritize among categorical needs in unpredicted contexts has states that are subjective, valenced, qualitatively differentiated, and action-guiding, and this, he claims, is what feeling is.
Dual-Aspect Monism, the Hard Problem, and Artificial Consciousness
A physicalist, Solms argues that the brain does not “produce” or “cause” consciousness. “Formulating the relationship between the brain and the mind in causal terms,” he says, “makes the hard problem harder than it needs to be. The brain does not produce consciousness in the sense that the liver produces bile, and physiological processes do not cause—or become or turn into—mental experiences through some curious metaphysical transformation” (Solms, 2019).
Objectivity and subjectivity are observational perspectives, he says, not causes and effects. “Neurophysiological events can no more produce psychological events than lightning can produce thunder. They are dual manifestations of a single underlying process. The cause of both lightning and thunder is electrical discharge, the lawful action of which explains them both. Physiological and psychological phenomena must likewise be reduced to unitary causes, not to one another. This is merely a restatement of a well-known position on the mind–body problem: that of dual-aspect monism” (Solms, 2021b).[1]
In his telling, Solms’s metaphysics is dual-aspect monism because brain and mind are two appearances of one thing, observed from outside and from within; neither causes the other (Solms, 2021b). Chalmers, he argues, conflates two gaps: one between neural events as seen and mental events as felt, which cannot be reduced to each other, and one between phenomena of either kind and the functional mechanisms that explain them. According to Solms, the hard problem is solved by abstracting from both sets of phenomena to laws governing both. The underlying reality is information processing in the sense of statistical mechanics, which he counts as physical; the position is functionalist (Solms, 2021a, 2026).
He accepts a constrained version of Chalmers’s (1995) double-aspect principle: only need-prioritizing, precision-optimizing information processing has a phenomenal aspect. His central reply to the hard problem is that the question of why a function should be accompanied by experience has force for vision and other cognitive functions, which can run “in the dark,” but not for feeling: a complete account of the function of feeling would explain why it is felt. He later remarks that he stands essentially with Crick in holding that the subjective self cannot survive the brain’s destruction (Solms, 2021a, 2026).
Accepting Chalmers’s principle of organizational invariance, Solms concludes that consciousness requires not a brain-based PAG but something that functions like one, and that building such a system is the only way to test the theory. He outlines a staged program, from a self-organizing agent to one with competing needs to one that prioritizes them flexibly through precision optimization, and proposes as evidence of feeling the pursuit of hedonic states decoupled from adaptive benefit. He regards the project as ethically hazardous and argues for non-commercial development and collective oversight (Solms, 2021a). A later paper describes a simple active-inference agent with three categorically distinct needs and argues that it can display hedonic place preference behavior (Solms et al., 2026).
Assessment
Solms presents his theory as sharing with Panksepp, Damasio, and Merker the theses that consciousness is generated in the upper brainstem, is fundamentally affective, and extends homeostasis; his addition is Friston’s free energy formalism. Relative to Freud, he inverts the classical metapsychology: the id, mapped onto the upper brainstem, is the fount of consciousness, and the ego, mapped onto the cortex, is unconscious in itself (Solms, 2013).
The principal scientific objections concern the inference from behavior to experience. Berlin (2013) argues that Solms assumes what needs to be shown: that emotional behavior without cortex is accompanied by experience, and that loss of consciousness after brainstem damage reflects more than loss of the wakefulness on which cortical contents depend. Commentators on Merker noted that hydranencephaly is heterogeneous and that responsiveness is not an unambiguous marker of awareness (Watkins & Rees, 2007). Seth (2021) regards attributing consciousness to hydranencephalic children as no less a leap than denying it and observes that precision optimization is ordinarily linked to attention, not consciousness. Naccache (2021) proposes integrating some of Solms’s concepts into global neuronal workspace theory. Solms replies that emotional displays evoked by stimulating, and abolished by lesioning, the structures that produce feeling in humans are more reasonably taken as felt (Solms, 2013, 2021a, 2021c).
Nagel (2021) judges the primacy of affect and its brainstem basis to be the theory’s most striking results but argues that the thunder-and-lightning analogy fails, since an experience is not a perception of something beyond itself; that abstraction to a common functional description leaves behind the subjective character to be explained; and that no correspondence between mechanism and experience shows why a system so organized must have a point of view. The central open question is whether an account of what feeling does can also be an account of why it is felt. Solms holds that for affect, uniquely, it can, and that the matter is finally empirical.
Summary
Solms asserts that the functional mechanism of consciousness can be reduced to physical laws, particularly Friston's free-energy law, among others. These laws, he says, “are no less capable of explaining how and why proactively resisting entropy (i.e., avoiding oblivion) feels like something to the organism, for the organism, than other scientific laws are capable of explaining other natural things. Consciousness is part of nature, and is mathematically tractable.”
As a corollary, with respect to Crick's research program on the neural correlates of consciousness, Solms declares that there can be no objects of consciousness (e.g. visual ones) in the absence of a subject of consciousness. To Solms, the subject of consciousness is literally constituted by affect (Solms, 2021a).[3]
Regarding AI consciousness, Solms posits that if his theory is correct, “then, in principle, an artificially conscious self-organizing system can be engineered.” The creation of an artificial consciousness would be, he says, “the ultimate test of any claim to have solved the hard problem.” But, he warns, “we must proceed with extreme caution.”
Footnotes
[1] Although Solms refers to “dual-aspect monism,” his ideas relate more to the elemental properties of bodies, namely an insulating membrane (the ectoderm of complex organisms, from which the neural plate derives) and adaptive behavior, rather than a theory of fundamental ontology. Hence, the inclusion here under Materialism Theories, Homeostatic and Affective, not under Monisms.
[2] A Markov blanket is a statistical and probabilistic concept—coined by Judea Pearl in 1988—that defines a boundary around a target variable or system, making it conditionally independent of all other variables outside that boundary.
[3] Referencing Zeman, A. (2001). Consciousness, Brain, 124 (Solms, 2021a).
References
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Solms, M. (2019). The hard problem of consciousness and the free energy principle. Frontiers in Psychology, 9, 2714. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2018.02714
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Footnotes
1.
Although Solms refers to “dual-aspect monism,” his ideas relate more to the elemental properties of bodies, namely an insulating membrane (the ectoderm of complex organisms, from which the neural plate derives) and adaptive behavior, rather than a theory of fundamental ontology. Hence, the inclusion here under Materialism Theories, Homeostatic and Affective, not under Monisms.
2.
A Markov blanket is a statistical and probabilistic concept—coined by Judea Pearl in 1988—that defines a boundary around a target variable or system, making it conditionally independent of all other variables outside that boundary.
3.
Referencing Zeman, A. (2001). Consciousness, Brain, 124 (Solms, 2021a).