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Property Dualism

Property Dualism is the idea that while there is only one kind of substance in the world, physical substance, there are two kinds of properties, mental and physical properties, such that mental properties, especially the phenomenal qualities of conscious experience, cannot be reduced to or explained by physical properties alone, even though on most versions both kinds of properties are generated by the same physical thing, namely brains. In its standard contrast with substance dualism, persons need no separate immaterial soul: physical organisms bear both physical and nonphysical phenomenal properties. Brain dependence therefore does not make consciousness wholly physical. The approach seeks to accommodate subjective experience without positing a distinct mental substance, but must explain psychophysical dependence, distinguish lawful correlation from metaphysical necessity, and address mental causation. Its disagreements with physicalism concern ontology, while its disagreements with substance dualism concern the bearer of experience.

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Property dualism philosophers

C. D. Broad, Frank Jackson, David Chalmers, Dean Zimmerman, Jaegwon Kim, John Searle, Ralph Weir, Peter van Inwagen, Raymond Tallis

*This summary was verified by Robert Lawrence Kuhn on November 16, 2026.

Landscape

Key Takeaways

  • Core Claim

    Physical organisms can bear irreducible nonphysical phenomenal properties without possessing a separate immaterial substance (like a soul).

  • Ontological Distinction

    Brain dependence does not make phenomenal properties physical; this is more than a difference in descriptions or knowledge; it's an ontological difference: phenomenal properties have unique ontological status.

  • Supervenience

    Lawful dependence under actual psychophysical laws can coexist with a denial of metaphysical necessitation by physical facts alone.

  • Key Example

    Knowing every physical fact about garlic smell may still seem insufficient for knowing its felt character; whether this establishes nonphysical facts is disputed.

  • Causal Options

    Property dualism can be interactionist or epiphenomenalist; neither follows merely from its basic ontological distinction.

  • Challenges

    The view must clarify psychophysical dependence, mental causation, phenomenal unity, and whether its arguments ultimately require nonphysical subjects.

Property Dualism

Property Dualism is the idea that while there is only one kind of substance in the world, physical substance, there are two kinds of properties, mental and physical properties, such that mental properties cannot be reduced to or explained by physical properties alone, even though, on most versions, both kinds of properties are generated by the same physical thing, namely brains. The dualism is ontological: phenomenal properties in particular, the felt qualities of experience, are held to be real features of the world over and above the physical, typically linked to brain processes by fundamental psychophysical laws of nature that physics alone does not contain. Versions range from early twentieth-century emergentism to David Chalmers’s naturalistic dualism, and divide over whether mental properties have physical effects (interactionist) or none (epiphenomenalist). Support comes chiefly from the knowledge argument, the conceivability of zombies, and the explanatory gap; objections concern mental causation, whether nonphysical properties can stop short of nonphysical substances, and whether the very notion is coherent (Broad, 1925; Jackson, 1982; Chalmers, 1996, 2003; Zimmerman, 2006).

More specifically, property dualism maintains that human persons are entirely physical objects, composed wholly of the constituents of fundamental physics, whose physical behavior is governed by the laws of physics, but also that they have, at the same time and equally inherent, non-physical properties or aspects, namely mental properties or aspects. Above all these are phenomenal properties, or qualia; on some versions, they also include intentional properties such as thoughts, concepts, and ideas. These properties are not reducible to, and not explainable by, the properties of fundamental physics (and its special science derivatives), even though, on most versions, they arise from those physical constituents through additional psychophysical laws. Simply, human persons would have nonphysical properties but no nonphysical parts.

Core Model and Supervenience

According to Dean Zimmerman, many who use the term follow David Chalmers in taking property dualism to mean that, “For at least some mental states, it is not possible to define, in terms of microphysical properties alone, a physical property common to all individuals in that mental state, and only to them.” Property dualism, then, would be the failure of a modal variety of supervenience, which states that “among all the possible individuals in all the possible worlds, there is no pair with all the same microphysical properties but different mental properties” (Zimmerman, 2006).

Zimmerman illustrates the point with two famous thought experiments in philosophy of mind: “It seems easy to imagine physically indiscernible zombies (animate human bodies with no consciousness) or people whose spectrum of color experiences is the reverse of one’s own. If genuinely possible, these scenarios show that the mental does not supervene upon the physical” (Zimmerman, 2006).

But in a wholly physical world, how could the mental not supervene upon the physical? How could different mental states arise from precisely the same microphysical states (down to the most fundamental physics)? If mental states can so arise, mustn’t something be missing, or arbitrary, in the physical world? If mental states cannot so arise, what then of property dualism? The standard answer distinguishes two strengths of supervenience. In our world, Chalmers holds, consciousness supervenes on the physical naturally, by law: the same physical state always brings the same experience. What fails is logical or metaphysical supervenience, since the physical facts do not necessitate the mental ones, and a world physically like ours but lacking consciousness is possible. Property dualists must accordingly admit additional laws governing the production of phenomenal qualities (Chalmers, 1996; Zimmerman, 2006).

It is sometimes said that property dualism is dualistic only in its epistemology, not in its ontology, so that consciousness remains wholly the product of brain function and the mind comes entirely from the brain, without residue. That describes a different position. The view that there is an epistemic gap between physical and phenomenal truths but no ontological gap is what Chalmers calls type-B materialism (Chalmers, 2003). Property dualism holds that the gap is ontological. Hence its central question: when super-advanced neuroscience accounts for all that can be known about the brain—though obviously it would be fiendishly complex—will there be nothing left over to explain about the mind? Property dualists answer that something will be left over.

Yet, property dualism has some mental properties as irreducible, a move that perhaps helps blunt attacks on materialist theories of consciousness. But what does this really mean? How irreducible? Irreducible in practice, for sure. But irreducible in principle? What would an absolute complete science, from fundamental physics to neuroscience, not capture? The property dualist’s answer is irreducibility in principle: a completed physics would not entail the phenomenal facts. C. D. Broad made the point in 1925 with his “mathematical archangel,” who, knowing everything about the microstructure of ammonia, still could not deduce how it smells (Broad, 1925).

Varieties of Property Dualism

Emergentist property dualism holds that when matter is organized in certain complex ways, genuinely new properties appear, governed by emergent laws that cannot be deduced from the laws of the parts; Broad applied this to the sensible qualities of experience (Broad, 1925). Chalmers’s naturalistic dualism treats consciousness as a fundamental feature of the world, connected to physical processes by psychophysical laws as basic as the laws of physics (Chalmers, 1996).

Property dualists divide over mental causation. Interactionist property dualism, Chalmers’s type-D, denies that physics is causally closed and gives phenomenal properties physical effects. Epiphenomenalist property dualism, his type-E, accepts closure and denies them any physical effects; Frank Jackson’s “Epiphenomenal Qualia” is the best-known defense (Jackson, 1982; Chalmers, 2003). Russellian monism, which locates phenomenal or protophenomenal properties in the intrinsic nature of physical entities, is classed by Chalmers as a monism (type-F), though some critics treat it as a form of property dualism (Chalmers, 2003; Weir, 2023).

Nearby positions sharpen the boundaries. Jaegwon Kim concluded that all mental properties except the intrinsic qualities of experience can be functionally reduced, leaving physicalism “not the whole truth” but “near enough” (Kim, 2005). John Searle, whose biological naturalism looks to many like property dualism, rejects the label and the view (Searle, 2002).

Comparison with Non-Reductive Physicalism

It is instructive to compare and contrast Property Dualism and Non-Reductive Physicalism. Both views are similar in their aim to explain the nature of consciousness in a world/universe/reality of only physical substances—there is only one kind of substance, the physical—but, in both views, crucially, mental states are not reducible to purely physical processes. That’s the similarity. The two views differ, perhaps significantly, in how they conceive the relationship between the mental and the physical—which impacts not only the deep nature of consciousness, but also the deep nature of all reality.

Under Property Dualism, there are two kinds of properties in the world/universe/reality: physical properties and non-physical (mental) properties. Everything (including brains) is made of physical substance but mental properties (qualia, consciousness) are not reducible to or fully explainable by physical properties. Even if you know all the physical facts about brain activity, you wouldn’t know what it’s like to smell garlic cooking in olive oil unless you experience it—because the property of ‘garlic-smell’ as experienced is not physical. This is a version of Frank Jackson’s knowledge argument (Jackson, 1982). In other words, mental properties are fundamentally distinct from physical properties, though they may arise from physical systems. Consciousness has unique ontological status.

Under Non-Reductive Physicalism, all substances and properties in the world/universe/reality are physical in nature, but mental properties are not reducible to lower-level physical explanations (like neurons or molecules). This means that while the physical gives rise to higher-level properties—mental states—they cannot be explained away by the lower-level properties. The mind emerges from brain processes, and while we can’t reduce beliefs and desires to neuronal impulses, they are still nothing over and above physical processes. In other words, mental properties are dependent on, determined by, and realized by physical states, but they are described at a different explanatory level. Realization, or, on some versions, weak emergence, is key.

It would seem easy to blur, or admix, Property Dualism and Non-Reductive Physicalism in that both recognize real mental states and yet only one kind of substance (physical, material substance)—but each makes a very different fundamental claim. To reiterate, Property Dualism relies on consciousness having special ontological status, while Non-Reductive Physicalism relies on physical realization. The difference shows in the strength of the dependence: for the non-reductive physicalist, the physical facts metaphysically necessitate the mental facts; for the property dualist, they do so only by natural law.

Critiques and Evaluations

The sharpest scientific objection concerns mental causation. If mental properties are distinct from physical ones and the physical world is causally closed, mental properties seem either to overdetermine physical effects or to cause nothing; Jaegwon Kim argued that only reduction escapes this dilemma (Kim, 1998). Property dualists accordingly either deny closure, accept epiphenomenalism, or look to Russellian views.

Philosopher Ralph Weir evaluates the common preference in philosophy of mind for varieties of property dualism over other alternatives to physicalism and certainly over substance dualism. He argues that the standard motivations for property dualism “lead directly to nonphysical substances resembling the soul of traditional metaphysics.” Using modal conceivability arguments about zombies and ghosts, and critiquing Russellian monist forms of property dualism, he concludes that “if you posit nonphysical properties in response to the mind-body problem, then you should be prepared to posit nonphysical substances as well” (Weir, 2023). William Lycan argues similarly that substance dualism is no less plausible than property dualism and has two advantages over it (Lycan, 2013).

Property dualism is placed first among the contemporary dualist theories in the Landscape because it is the most materialistic, the least dualistic, of the bunch. While I appreciate its important role in the development of philosophy of mind, I must admit that I’ve never had it near top-of-list in the marketplace of fundamental theories.

Philosopher Peter van Inwagen muses that “‘property dualism’ is a very odd name to give it.” His argument clarifies the essence of dualism itself. “If there are non-physical substances, then physical and non-physical substances (a cat and an angel, for example) are clean different kinds of thing. Although they are both substances right enough, the division of the category ‘substance’ into the sub-categories ‘physical’ and ‘non-physical’ is an ontologically significant division. We call Descartes and Plato dualists because they think there are substances in both sub-categories. I would suppose that ‘property dualists’ call themselves dualists because they think that the division of properties into physical and non-physical properties is an ontologically significant division of the category ‘property’, a division as significant as the physical/non-physical division of the category ‘substance’. If this is so, I think that the self-chosen description ‘property dualist’ indicates a metaphysical confusion in the way property dualists conceive of properties” (van Inwagen, 2007).

According to philosopher-humanist Raymond Tallis, “Property dualism, as embraced by many neurophilosophers, does not therefore seem fundamentally different from materialism. Mind seems to have lost its status as the ontological equal of matter, applying equal traction to the order of things. Matter is everywhere – it seems to be the default mode of being. Mind, by contrast, is localised, existing only in minute stretches of the material world, courtesy of the behaviour of certain portions of matter. As such, it is not matter’s equal. What is more, its late emergence, such that some matter woke up to itself long after the beginning of the universe, seems to lack explanation…. The relative attractiveness of property dualism may be explained by the sense that properties are less divorced from one another than are different substances. However, it raises, and fails to address, the entirely reasonable question: “Properties of what?” And if the properties are deemed close enough to be housed in the same place, this will not do justice to the depth of the difference between matter and mind – between moving ions and the thought that Paris is the capital of France” (Tallis, 2026).

Nonetheless, unlike much-disparaged substance dualism, property dualism remains a respectable position within philosophy of mind (Zimmerman, 2006).

Editor’s Note: Property dualism is placed first among the contemporary dualist theories in the Landscape because it is the most materialistic, the least dualistic, of the bunch. While I/RLK appreciate its important role in the development of philosophy of mind, I must admit that I’ve never had it near top-of-list in the marketplace of fundamental theories.

References

Broad, C. D. (1925). The Mind and Its Place in Nature. Routledge & Kegan Paul.

Chalmers, D. J. (1996). The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory. Oxford University Press.

Chalmers, D. J. (2003). Consciousness and its place in nature. In S. P. Stich & T. A. Warfield (Eds.), The Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell.

Jackson, F. (1982). Epiphenomenal qualia. Philosophical Quarterly, 32(127), 127–136.

Kim, J. (1998). Mind in a Physical World: An Essay on the Mind-Body Problem and Mental Causation. MIT Press.

Kim, J. (2005). Physicalism, or Something Near Enough. Princeton University Press.

Lycan, W. G. (2013). Is property dualism better off than substance dualism? Philosophical Studies, 164(2), 533–542.

Searle, J. R. (2002). Why I am not a property dualist. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 9(12), 57–64.

Tallis, R. (2026). Cut-price dualism: ‘Properties not substances’. Philosophy Now, 174.

van Inwagen, P. (2007). A materialist ontology of the human person. In P. van Inwagen & D. Zimmerman (Eds.), Persons: Human and Divine (pp. 199–215). Clarendon Press.

Weir, R. S. (2023). The Mind-Body Problem and Metaphysics: An Argument from Consciousness to Mental Substance. Routledge.

Zimmerman, D. (2006). Dualism in the philosophy of mind. In D. M. Borchert (Ed.), Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2nd ed., Vol. 3, pp. 113ff.). Macmillan Reference USA.

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