Kriegel’s Cross-Order Self-Representation

Philosopher Uriah Kriegel’s Cross-Order Integration theory holds that a phenomenally conscious state is a single, unified representational state containing two integrated components: a first-order representation of an object or condition and a higher-order representation of that very first-order state. Unlike standard higher-order theories, which posit one mental state representing another, Kriegel’s self-representationalism makes the awareness of experience internal to the experience itself. Phenomenal consciousness therefore combines world-directed qualitative character with subjective character—the implicit for-me-ness through which an experience presents itself as occurring to the subject (Kriegel, 2006, 2009).

In other words, Kriegel states that a mental state is phenomenally conscious in virtue of representing itself, and that self-representation is realized by the functional integration of a first-order representation of the world with a higher-order representation of that first-order state. Where standard higher-order theories keep the two distinct, cross-order integration unifies them into a single complex state representing both the external object and itself—which is why, on Kriegel's account, experience exhibits both a qualitative character, what the state represents about the world, and a subjective character, its for-me-ness. The ambitious proposal is designed to answer what Kriegel calls "the why question" facing hypotheses about the neural correlate of consciousness: why should this neural feature rather than another correlate with experience?

One State, Two Representational Orders

A visual experience of red represents a red surface or a red-looking object. On Kriegel’s account, the same conscious state also represents itself as representing red. These are distinct representational functions but not independent mental episodes. They are integrated into one complex state, much as one perceptual representation may contain distinguishable yet unified information about color, shape, and location.

This architecture is “cross-order” because it joins first-order object representation with second-order self-representation. It is “same-state” or self-representational because the higher-order component targets the state of which it is a constituent. The model avoids a regress: consciousness does not require a further state representing the self-representing state, because the original state already includes the relevant reflexive awareness.

Subjective Character and For-Me-Ness

Kriegel distinguishes two components of a phenomenally conscious state. Qualitative character is what it is like to have the state—its bluishness, say. Subjective character is the fact that there is something it is like for the subject at all: conscious experiences do not merely occur in me, as my heartbeat does, but are also for me (Kriegel, 2009). Kriegel takes subjective character to be the more fundamental component, and argues that a state can be for me only if I am in some way aware of it. The relevant awareness is not attentive introspection but peripheral inner awareness, a dim constant accompaniment of experience that does not compete with outward-directed attention—placing the account in a tradition from Brentano, on which conscious states are directed both at the world and, secondarily, at themselves (Brentano, 1874).

Why Not Standard Higher-Order Theory?

Higher-order theories hold that a state is conscious when represented by a distinct higher-order state (Rosenthal, 2005). Kriegel's objection is structural. If the higher-order state is genuinely separate, then what confers consciousness on the first-order state is external to it, and the account struggles to explain why the first-order state should acquire a subjective character of its own rather than merely being registered. Self-representationalism answers by having the conscious state represent itself; cross-order integration specifies how this is achieved without positing an unanalyzable reflexive act (Kriegel, 2006; Kriegel and Williford, 2006). The self-representing state is a complex whose parts stand in a suitable integration relation—the same relation, Kriegel suggests, that binds features into a single perceptual object, applied across representational orders rather than within one.

The Cross-Order Integration Hypothesis

The resulting theory identifies three elements whose relations must be specified (Kriegel, 2007). There is a floor-level representation, which determines the specific contents of experience once consciousness is present but does not ensure that it is present. There is a higher-order representation of that floor-level representation. And there is the functional integration of the two, characterized as unifying disparate information into a single representation whose functional role exceeds the sum of its components' roles. The critical claim is that the second and third elements together, not the first, constitute the correlate of consciousness as such. This separates the question of why there is experience from the question of what the experience is of, assigning them to different components of one structure.

Deriving a Neural Correlate

Kriegel argues that most neural correlate proposals are empirically motivated but theoretically deficient—they identify a feature that covaries with consciousness without explaining why it should. Deriving the correlate from a theory of what consciousness is answers the why question by construction. The derivation proceeds in two steps: a general shape follows from the theory, specifying that the correlate must comprise a neural realizer of a higher-order representation together with a realizer of its integration with a floor-level representation; a concrete hypothesis then requires empirical input about which structures realize higher-order representations, with prefrontal regions the principal candidates. The theory predicts, distinctively, that neither region alone is the correlate—synchronization or comparable integration between prefrontal and sensory populations is required (Kriegel, 2007).

Objections and Standing

Three lines of criticism recur. The regress worry asks how a state's representing itself avoids either circularity or an infinite loop, and whether the integration relation genuinely dissolves the problem or renames it. The transparency objection holds that introspection discloses only the world, not our experience of it, casting doubt on peripheral inner awareness as a datum (Gertler, 2012); how far for-me-ness is phenomenologically given remains disputed (Zahavi and Kriegel, 2016). And a reductive worry asks whether self-representation is sufficient for phenomenality, since representational structures of the specified kind might obtain in states no one would call conscious (Brogaard, 2012). Empirically, the theory shares with higher-order accounts the exposure created by evidence that prefrontal damage leaves much conscious experience intact.

Assessment

Cross-order integration is the leading contemporary development of self-representationalism, the third standard position alongside first-order and higher-order representationalism. Its distinctiveness is methodological priority: it derives a neural correlate hypothesis from a philosophical theory rather than reading a theory off correlational data, making explicit a demand—that correlates be explanatorily rather than merely statistically motivated—that applies well beyond Kriegel's own framework. Whether integration across representational orders explains for-me-ness or presupposes it circularly remains the open question on which the account turns.

References

Brentano, F. (1874). Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt. Leipzig: Duncker und Humblot.

Brogaard, B. (2012). Are conscious states conscious in virtue of representing themselves? Philosophical Studies, 159(3), 467–474.

Gertler, B. (2012). Conscious states as objects of awareness. Philosophical Studies, 159(3), 447–455.

Kriegel, U. (2006). The same-order monitoring theory of consciousness. In U. Kriegel and K. Williford (Eds.), Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness (pp. 143–170). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Kriegel, U. (2007). A cross-order integration hypothesis for the neural correlate of consciousness. Consciousness and Cognition, 16(4), 897–912.

Kriegel, U. (2009). Subjective Consciousness: A Self-Representational Theory. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Kriegel, U., and Williford, K. (Eds.). (2006). Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Rosenthal, D. M. (2005). Consciousness and Mind. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Zahavi, D., and Kriegel, U. (2016). For-me-ness: What it is and what it is not. In D. O. Dahlstrom, A. Elpidorou, and W. Hopp (Eds.), Philosophy of Mind and Phenomenology (pp. 36–53). New York: Routledge.