Dretske’s Information and Representationalism

Philosopher Fred Dretske's theory of consciousness centers around the informational and representational nature of mental states and a naturalistic account of intentionality, all within a scientific, materialistic framework. Dretske's representational theory is considered a first-order theory because it holds that conscious experiences consist in, or are identical to, certain kinds of first-order mental representations—that is, representations of the external world, not of other mental states (Dretske, 1988, 1995).

Consciousness as Information and Representation

Dretske’s theory begins with the notion that mental states represent information about the world. Consciousness arises when certain internal states of a system (like a brain) carry information in a special and usable way. He says, “Information is what is needed to reduce uncertainty, to answer questions, to guide action” (Dretske, 1981).

He distinguishes between natural information, which is a causal relationship between a signal and a condition, and representation, which involves a system using that information. Conscious mental states represent the things they are about, and these representations are causally active in behavior.

He also distinguishes between phenomenal consciousness (what-it-is-like inner experience) and access consciousness (availability to report and act). He considers phenomenal consciousness to be a special kind of representation—not about what you know, but how the information is represented. “The difference between conscious and unconscious experience is not what is represented but the way it is represented” (Dretske, 1995).

Dretske offers the nuanced view that in conscious perception, we are not aware of representations per se, but of what they represent—this is called the transparency thesis. This aligns with representationalism: consciousness consists in being aware of external features via internal representations. You see the red apple, not your representation of the red apple. “We are not conscious of experiences; we are conscious of the things we experience” (Dretske, 1995).

Dretske links consciousness to attention and functional use. A mental state becomes conscious when its content is available for use in reasoning, planning, or verbal report—what he calls “selective representation.” This distinguishes conscious mental states from unconscious ones by functional role—especially the role in controlling action and communication. “Conscious experience is a representational state of the system that is poised to have an effect on other representational states” (Dretske, 1995).

First-Order Theory and Qualia

Dretske knows he must deal with qualia, the subjective feel of inner experience, and he seeks to naturalize it. He rejects that qualia are mysterious, intrinsic non-physical properties; they are rather properties of representational states. He claims to undermine Chalmers’ “hard problem” by arguing that once we understand how content is represented and used, no further explanatory gap will remain.

It is said that Dretske’s ways of thinking laid the groundwork for subsequent representationalist theories, including those of Michael Tye and William Lycan.

The reason why Dretske’s theory is considered a first-order representational theory of consciousness is because, in his theory, a mental state represents the external world (objects, events, sights, sounds, etc.) in a particular way; it does not require that a mental state be the object of another mental state—there is no need for a “thought about a thought” (as higher-order theories require). “We are not conscious of experiences; we are conscious of the things we experience,” meaning external, mind-independent features of the world (Dretske, 1995).

Dretske explicitly rejects the need for higher-order awareness to explain consciousness (much as he rejects dualism). He argues that the content and function of a first-order representation—when poised for use in reasoning, action, or reporting—is enough to constitute conscious experience. “The difference between conscious and unconscious experience is not what is represented but the way it is represented” (Dretske, 1995).