Composite Dualism
Modern dualism in philosophy of mind begins with Descartes, who famously divides the world between the physical and the mental. He was motivated by the obvious distinction that the mind has thought but no extension, while the body has extension but no thought. Yet, body and mind both seem needed to have a human person.
Richard Swinburne
Philosopher
Richard Swinburne is an English philosopher, Emeritus Nolloth Professor of the Philosophy of the Christian Religion at the University of Oxford. He has been a leading proponent of philosophical arguments for the existence and nature of God. His influential books include The Coherence of Theism, The Existence of God, and Faith and Reason. He has contributed to reviving substance dualism.
Key Takeaways
Core Claim
A human person is made of both a physical body and a nonphysical soul, each essential to identity.
How It Works
The body enables public interaction, while the soul carries ultimate, unanalyzable differences between individuals.
Distinguishing Idea
Souls may exist without bodies, but are typically recognized and distinguished through their bodily associations.
Function Debate
Some hold the soul can think independently; others believe it functions only when joined to a body.
Ultimate Difference
Each soul’s individuality is basic and unanalyzable, not derived from physical traits or relationships.
Composite Dualism
Modern dualism in philosophy of mind begins with Descartes who famously divides the world between the physical and the mental. He was motivated by the obvious distinction that the mind has thought but no extension while the body has extension but no thought. Yet body and mind both seem needed to have a human person.
Composite dualists require both body and mind to constitute a person, where “body” generally denotes brain and “mind” generally denotes soul. There are of course variations and problems (Zimmerman, 2005). A key question is whether the nonphysical part, the soul, has mental states independent from the body/brain? To most dualists, both historical and contemporary, the soul does indeed.
Definition and Key Questions
As to the relationship between the body and the soul, philosopher Richard Swinburne is ambivalent. "Maybe, of course, a soul can't function on its own," he said. "Maybe it can only function when associated with a body. In that case, my continued existence would consist in it being joined to a body again, perhaps an entirely new body. I think a soul could exist on its own, but not a great deal turns on that." A body is required, Swinburne said, because "for us to interact with others, to recognize others, we need different public characteristics” (Swinburne, 2016; Kuhn, 2016b).
Swinburne on the Nature of the Soul
I asked Swinburne to speculate on the essence or composition of such a soul. Is it a differentiated substance? What's to prevent your soul from getting mixed up with my soul?
"The difference between souls is ultimate, unanalyzable by anything else," Swinburne responded. "A soul has no extension. It is an 'immaterial particular', to use an old-fashioned philosophical term. It does, of course, have characteristics, properties. It has thoughts, feelings, attitudes, and so on. But the way we distinguish in practice between souls is in terms of the bodies with which they are associated because the difference between your soul and my soul, being ultimate, does not consist in their relations to our respective bodies. There is of course nothing paradoxical about the difference between souls being unanalyzable, because some differences must be ultimate; if you can analyze 'a' by 'b' and 'b' by 'c' and so on, you eventually get to things which you can't analyze, and the differences between human souls in my view are one of those things. This is why the only way souls can have a public presence is through their attachment to bodies” (Swinburne, 2007, 2016).
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