Brown’s “HOROR” Higher-Order Representationalism

Philosopher Richard Brown’s Higher-Order Representation of a Representation (HOROR) theory of consciousness makes the core claim that “phenomenal consciousness consists in instantiating a certain kind of higher-order representation.” Suppose, he says, “that one is having a vivid conscious experience of red. In that case, HOROR theory says that the relevant, seemingly non-inferential, higher-order representation will have something like the following as its intentional content: I, myself, am having this visual representation of red. This higher-order representation represents that one is oneself having or instantiating a certain first-order mental representation (or perhaps that one is instantiating a certain set of first-order representations). This representation is thought-like in that it is composed of intentional contents and arranged so as to have assertoric force. Because one represents oneself as instantiating various mental properties it will appear to one as though one has phenomenal consciousness” (Brown, 2015).

Representations of Representations

Brown’s HOROR theory, developed in collaboration with neuroscientist/philosopher Hakwan Lau, is an advanced theory in the higher-order thought (HOT) tradition in the philosophy of mind (e.g., David Rosenthal). The central idea of HOROR theory is that consciousness arises not from a higher-order representation of a mental state (like sights or sounds) but rather from a higher-order representation of a representation.

In other words, for a state to be conscious, the subject must represent the fact that there is a representation going on, without necessarily representing the first-order content directly. This second-order awareness is still conceptual or cognitive, but it targets the representational status of the first-order state (Brown & Lau, 2019).

This marks a subtle but important distinction from traditional HOT theories, like those of David Rosenthal, where a higher-order thought represents a lower-order state (e.g., a visual experience), and that is what makes the state conscious. Brown and Lau argue instead that consciousness arises from representing representations themselves, not just particular mental states. “A mental state is conscious not in virtue of being the object of a higher-order representation that says, in effect, ‘I am seeing red,’ but in virtue of the existence of a representation of the representation as such” (Brown & Lau, 2019).

Subjective vs. Phenomenal Character

Brown distinguishes two different kinds of phenomenal consciousness. “On the one hand we have the state’s subjective character. The subjective character of a phenomenally conscious experience is that part of the experience which makes it the case that it is experienced as being for me. On the HOROR theory, this comes from the fact that one represents oneself as being in these various states. On the other hand, the phenomenal character of a conscious experience is that part of the experience which would distinguish a conscious experience of red from a conscious experience of blue, and both of those from the conscious experience of the sound of a trumpet. According to the HOROR theory, this will turn out to be the intentional content of the higher-order representation” (Brown, 2015).

Addressing Objections and Functional Role

Brown and Lau developed the HOROR theory partly in response to common objections to standard HOT theories, such as the following:

• The Misrepresentation Problem: Critics argue HOT allows for situations where a higher-order thought says, “I am in pain,” even if no first-order pain exists. HOROR avoids this, the authors say, by focusing on representations themselves rather than their content.
• Phenomenal Overflow: Some argue that there’s more in our phenomenology than we can access cognitively. HOROR responds: “Consciousness is always tied to cognitive access because it depends on a kind of representation that is part of cognitive architecture” (Brown, 2015).
• Introspective Evidence: HOROR theory, the authors claim, better fits with the fact that we rarely represent our states as having specific content but are still aware that we are in some kind of state.

HOROR proposes that consciousness is not a property of first-order states per se. Rather, it arises when a cognitive system represents a first-order representation, regardless of its content. These representations of representations are cognitive and inferential, not necessarily introspective in a traditional sense. “What makes a mental state phenomenally conscious is that there is a higher-order state that represents some mental state as a representation” (Brown & Lau, 2019).

HOROR supports a functionalist view where consciousness plays a cognitive role in reasoning, planning, and confidence judgments.