Bitar’s Architectural Theory of Consciousness

Computer scientist and independent theorist Philip Bitar proposes an architectural theory of consciousness (ATC). In this theory, the structure of the mind is the basis for explaining consciousness. In order to achieve simplicity in this endeavor, Bitar says he has developed his theory in straightforward, materialist terms that are consistent with mainstream science (Bitar, 2023).

Automatic-Volitional Architecture (AVA)

Bitar’s foundational concept is a goal-processing system—a system that creates goals and that works to achieve goals. An intelligent agent is a goal-processing system that controls its body, as do humans, lower animals, and robots. A mind is the control system of a biological intelligent agent, that is, an animal with a brain. A mind is implemented by a brain.

According to Bitar, we can explain consciousness in terms of the structure of the mind by developing a theory of mind that he refers to as the automatic-volitional architecture (AVA). He argues that this architecture is necessary for the survival of an animal. Bitar illustrates this architecture with a block diagram of the four main components of a mind: a sensory unit, a motor unit, a parallel-processing unit, and a serial-processing unit. Click to see the figure.

Bitar develops the AVA theory as follows.

In order to maximize the response rate of the agent body, the body must have a control system with a parallel processing unit (PPU) by which it simultaneously processes multiple sensory inputs and multiple motor outputs. In the absence of a PPU for this purpose, an animal could not survive.

In order for the agent to competently manage its body, the body must have a control system with a serial processing unit (SPU) by which it centrally manages the body. In the absence of an SPU for this purpose, an animal could not survive.

Bitar refers to the SPU as the volitional unit because its processes are subject to direct intentional control. These volitional processes are conscious, and conscious processes are necessarily serial. Consciousness is nothing more than the subjective concept that we use to characterize the nature of information as represented by the serial processing unit.

Bitar refers to the PPU as the automatic unit because its processes are not subject to direct intentional control. Since PPU processes operate in parallel, these processes are necessarily unconscious.

Overall, Bitar says, the automatic unit is the engine of the mind, while the volitional unit is the pilot. The volitional unit manages the mind with two operations: focusing attention and approving/disapproving proposals from the automatic unit. The automatic unit executes proposals that are approved by the volitional unit. The interactions between the volitional unit and the automatic unit are highly complex, with the two units working together to skillfully achieve the goals of the mind. The automatic-volitional architecture is implemented by a brain.

Regarding neural substrates, Bitar says that the neural components for the sensory unit and the motor unit are well identified, but the cerebral components for the volitional unit and the automatic unit are not. Presumably, the volitional unit and the automatic unit are implemented by cerebral regions that are largely distinct but that overlap at their boundaries. The prefrontal cortex plays a major role in implementing the volitional unit through executive functions, while the rest of the brain largely implements the automatic unit and its highly complex interactions with the volitional unit.

Materialism and the Privacy of Mind

According to Bitar, the reason that our mind seems immaterial is that it is private: our mind is not directly observable by our sensory systems. However, assuming immateriality adds unnecessary complexity by posing the problem of how a material brain can cause immaterial activity. A simpler explanation assumes that mental activity is material but is private. In this way, we eliminate immateriality from the theory of mind just as biologists eliminated vitalism from the theory of life.

To make this insight concrete, Bitar asks us to imagine that the brain is constructed to display our conscious visual experiences on a screen on the back of our head. This is theoretically possible if such experiences are material, per the prior paragraph. Now, suppose that as you look at this page, someone looks at the screen on the back of your head. They will see a display of your private visual experience of looking at this page, subject to the physical limitations of the display. Bitar says that if this were the way that our brain worked, the idea that conscious visual experiences are immaterial would never have occurred.

Bitar asks us to consider the following assertions. The intuition that mental activity is immaterial has been prominent through the ages in the concepts of supernatural beings, magical beings such as genies, and human spiritual activity. In fact, the intuition is so subtle that even modern scholars may fail to notice it. According to Bitar, this oversight is exemplified in the 1996 Chalmers proof that consciousness is immaterial: Chalmers inadvertently assumes what he claims to prove, namely, that consciousness is not physical (Bitar, 2023).

Regarding unnecessary complexity in theories, Bitar proposes three criteria that any theory must satisfy: predictive accuracy is primary, simplicity is secondary, and logical coherence is implicit. Thus, if two theories have equal predictive accuracy, the more complex is rejected.

The foregoing insights on materialism resolve the longstanding mind-body problem, along with the recent version of it known as the hard problem of consciousness.

Other Minds and Artificial Minds

Bitar reasons as follows. I can observe my mind, but I cannot observe your mind, as implied above. I assume that you have a mind just as I do because of the similarity in structure and function of my body and yours. This is also the reason that I assume that a lower animal with a brain has a mind, but with reduced intellectual capacity, as evidenced by its behavior.

What about computers? Bitar reasons as follows. Suppose that we create an electronic robot whose behavior is indistinguishable from that of humans. Should we infer that the robot has a mind? The answer is no because we have no rationale by which to attribute consciousness to the robot, even if its control system has an automatic-volitional architecture. The reason is that the robot’s internal representation of information is electronic, and we know only that a human's biological representation of information creates conscious experience. As a result, assuming that a robot has conscious experience adds unnecessary complexity to our theory of the robot control system, so we exclude this assumption.

Summary

According to Bitar, we can explain consciousness based on two insights: the automatic-volitional architecture of the mind (AVA) and the private nature of the mind.

An AVA is necessary in order for an animal to survive. Consciousness is nothing more than the subjective concept that we use to characterize the nature of information as represented by the volitional unit—the high-level serial processing unit of the mind. This serial format is the objective definition of consciousness.

An animal mind is private, not directly observable by sensory systems. This is why a person's mind seems immaterial to the person. However, assuming immateriality adds unnecessary complexity to a theory of mind, as exemplified by the otherwise unsolvable mind-body problem.

This architectural theory of consciousness explains the high-level operations of the mind, along with the role of conscious experience in these operations. This architectural theory is consistent with mainstream science, thereby resolving the mystery of consciousness not only accurately but simply.