Shoemaker’s Functionalist Realism About Qualia
Sydney Shoemaker defends realism about qualia within a materialist, functionalist theory of mind. Functional organization characterizes having experience and relations of qualitative similarity and difference, while particular feels can depend on physical realization. Individual qualia cannot be functionally defined, since spectrum inversion is possible, but qualitative similarity and the class of qualitative states can be; absent qualia are impossible. Phenomenal character is self-intimation: awareness of it is not inner perception but part of having such states. His accounts of introspection and self-reference connect experience with first-person knowledge without positing an inner observer. In later work, phenomenal character is representational content, in which experiences represent perceiver-relative “appearance properties” of things alongside their colors. Qualia are physically realized, on his subset account of realization, yet he grants that an explanatory gap remains.

Sydney Shoemaker
Professor of Philosophy
Sydney Shoemaker (1931–2022) was an American philosopher and Susan Linn Sage Professor of Philosophy Emeritus at Cornell University. Educated at Reed College and Cornell, he became a central contributor to philosophy of mind and metaphysics. His research addressed qualia, self-knowledge, personal identity, mental causation, and physical realization. His books include Self-Knowledge and Self-Identity, Identity, Cause and Mind, The First-Person Perspective and Other Essays, and Physical Realization. He served as president of the American Philosophical Association’s Eastern Division and was elected to the American Academy of Arts and Sciences in 1996.
Shoemaker’s Functionalist Realism About Qualia
Sydney Shoemaker holds that phenomenal consciousness is real, physically realized, and compatible with functionalism: experiences have qualia, the properties that fix what it is like to have them, and although no individual quale can be defined by its causal role, the relations of qualitative similarity and difference among experiences can be, and so can the class of qualitative states. Over four decades he joined this position to two further theses: that phenomenal character is “self-intimating,” so that a subject’s awareness of it is not a kind of inner perception but belongs to what it is to have such states; and that phenomenal character is a species of representational content, in which experiences represent the “appearance properties” of things as well as their objective properties. Beneath all three lies a metaphysics in which properties are individuated by the causal powers they confer and mental properties are realized in physical ones (Shoemaker, 1975, 1982, 1996, 2000, 2007).
In other words, his account of phenomenal consciousness combines realism about qualitative experience with functionalism, physicalism, and a distinctive representationalism. Qualia are physically realizable properties of experiential states: functional organization determines the presence of experience, although it need not uniquely determine particular feels. His mature account explains perceptual phenomenal character through the representation of perceiver-relative appearance properties, accommodating spectrum inversion without treating either observer as mistaken about objective colors. His accounts of introspection, self-reference, and mental unity support this synthesis, which preserves first-person knowledge while rejecting both an inner observer and nonphysical experiential substances (Shoemaker, 1991, 2000, 2007, 2019).
Qualia Within Functionalism
Shoemaker rejects the choice between eliminating qualia to save functionalism and abandoning physicalism to preserve experience. Shoemaker calls his position “compatibilist”: he accepts qualia and also accepts a materialist and functionalist view of mind, against those who think qualia refute functionalism and those who think functionalism shows there are no qualia (Shoemaker, 1996). (His “compatibilism” concerns these positions, rather than free will.)
His starting point is the pair of objections that Block and Fodor (1972) raised against functionalism: inverted and absent qualia. He grants that the possibility of inversion shows individual qualia not to be functionally definable, and treats this as his one concession. What can be functionally defined is qualitative similarity and difference, by their role within a single subject in discrimination, recognition, and the formation of perceptual belief. Qualia are then the properties of experiences in virtue of which they stand in these relations, and a state is qualitative if it has some such property. Which quale an experience has is settled by its physical realization, and the same quale may be realized differently in different creatures (Shoemaker, 1975, 2000).
A functional account specifies mental states through their relationships to sensory inputs, other mental states, and behavior; it must include the internal organization supporting discrimination, recognition, memory, and introspective judgment, rather than merely matching outward responses.
The crucial distinction is between functionally characterizing what makes a property a quale and functionally defining each particular quale. Shoemaker accepts that individual qualitative properties need not have unique functional definitions. Nevertheless, whether states have qualitative character, and how experiences resemble or differ from one another, can receive functional characterization (Shoemaker, 1991). This permits a qualitative structure to be functionally fixed without every determinate feel being uniquely identified by its position in that structure.
His opposition to absent qualia accordingly differs from his acceptance of inverted qualia: preserving the appropriate functional organization cannot simply remove experience altogether, even if it leaves open which particular experiences occur (Shoemaker, 2007, 2019).
Absent Qualia and Inverted Spectra
The two thought experiments receive opposite verdicts. If absent qualia were possible, a state functionally identical to pain could lack qualitative character altogether; the presence or absence of that character would then make no difference to the state’s effects, including its effects on the subject’s beliefs about it, and qualitative character would be unknowable. Since we do know the qualitative character of our own states, Shoemaker concludes that absent qualia are impossible (Shoemaker, 1975, 1981). Block (1980) replied that a qualia-free duplicate could exist even if qualitative character is causally crucial in the genuine case.
Inversion, by contrast, he accepts, and it shapes the rest of the theory. In later work he relies on a modest form: experiences of the same colored things can differ in phenomenal character between perceivers, and experiences of differently colored things can match, with neither perceiver misperceiving. He cites variation among normal observers in which shades look uniquely green or blue as evidence that phenomenal character depends partly on the perceiver’s visual system. It follows that no phenomenal character is necessary, and if full inversion is possible none is sufficient, for representing a given color (Shoemaker, 1982, 2000).
Self-Intimation and the Rejection of Inner Sense
Shoemaker denies that introspection is perception turned inward. A perceptual model requires that the thing perceived exist independently of its being perceived; he argues that mental states, phenomenal states included, are self-intimating, so that being in them is not independent of being disposed to know that one is (Shoemaker, 1996). For phenomenal character, this means that it is essential to an experience’s having a given character that its subject is introspectively aware of it, or would be on reflection. Introspective awareness is awareness that one is in a state, not awareness of an inner object: there are no after-images or pains serving as items inspected, and experiences are states of persons, not entities whose features one scans (Shoemaker, 2000). The thesis serves the functionalism, since the tie between a qualitative state and belief about it is part of the state’s causal role, and it carries the argument against absent qualia.
Appearance Properties and Representationalism
Standard representationalism identifies phenomenal character with the representation of objective properties such as colors, which implies that if two perceivers differ phenomenally in viewing one surface, one of them misperceives. Shoemaker rejects that implication but keeps representationalism. If two spectrum-inverted perceivers both see a red thing correctly as red, their experiences must differ in representing some further property, and that difference is the difference in phenomenal character. He first called these “phenomenal properties” and later “appearance properties”: occurrent ones, which a thing has when it is appearing a certain way to a perceiver, and dispositional ones, which it has in being apt to appear that way to perceivers of a certain kind. They are relational and perceiver-dependent yet belong to the things perceived, so the view is neither projectivist nor a sense-datum theory, and it respects the transparency of experience (Shoemaker, 1996, 2000, 2003). Thompson (2007) classifies the result as a Russellian theory of phenomenal content motivated by inversion without illusion and by transparency.
Qualia remain in the account as properties of experiences that essentially represent appearance properties. Shoemaker at first held that qualia are known only by description, as whatever properties of experience ground the appearance properties of things; he later held that the qualia constituting phenomenal character are themselves introspectively accessible. The view is externalist about objective content and, to a first approximation, internalist about phenomenal content, in contrast to the externalist representationalisms of Dretske and Tye (Shoemaker, 2000, 2003).
Physical Realization and Alien Experience
Shoemaker’s metaphysics supplies the physicalist framework. His causal theory individuates properties through their causal features; the subset account of realization explains how a physical property can realize a mental property while preserving the latter’s causal efficacy. On its central condition, the causal powers of a realized property form a subset of those of its realizer. Mental causation is thereby accommodated within physical causation, rather than added as a competing force (Shoemaker, 2007).
His late formulation sharply separates having experience from having specifically human experiences. The general capacity is functionally characterizable, but determinate phenomenal characters depend on realization details. A robot sharing our relevant psychological functional organization could therefore experience alien qualia rather than our own. The resulting position combines functional sufficiency for phenomenality with sensitivity to the neurobiological realization of particular feels (Shoemaker, 2019). It neither excludes artificial consciousness categorically nor licenses attributing human phenomenology to a system merely because its outputs resemble ours.
Explanatory Scope and Remaining Disputes
Shoemaker offers a philosophical synthesis, rather than a neural mechanism or experimentally established solution. Its strength is to integrate qualitative realism, representational content, causal efficacy, and first-person knowledge without treating them as mutually exclusive commitments.
His metaphysics of properties supports the whole. Properties are individuated by the conditional causal powers they bestow (Shoemaker, 1980), and one property realizes another when the powers bestowed by the realized property are a subset of those bestowed by the realizer. Mental properties are therefore physically realized without being identical to their realizers, and their causal efficacy is not pre-empted by them; the final chapter of Physical Realization applies the account to qualia (Shoemaker, 2007).
The central disputes concern whether appearance properties genuinely belong to perceptual content and whether their joint specification with experiential kinds explains phenomenal character or relocates the problem. Egan (2006) and Thompson (2007) challenge proposed appearance-property candidates; Thompson argues that the account either makes misperception too difficult or fails to accommodate veridical inversion. Block (2019) accepts the challenge to phenomenal externalism but questions Shoemaker’s positive account and its reliance on transparency. More fundamentally, functional characterization of experiential structure and physical realization still leave the demand to explain why these realizations have these particular feels. Shoemaker constrains that explanatory gap without making qualitative experience disappear.
Shoemaker does not claim that all of this dissolves the explanatory gap. The gap between how colors appear and their physical nature is reduced to the gap between phenomenal states and their realizers, and of that he says the physical facts exclude a creature functionally like us with no phenomenal states (i.e., philosophical zombies), but do not make transparent why an experience has the specific character it has (Shoemaker, 2003).
Assessment
Shoemaker’s working theory is a sustained attempt to keep three things together that are usually traded against one another: realism about qualia, functionalism, and representationalism. It differs from Functionalism in its generic form by conceding that individual qualia escape functional definition, from Block’s Biological Reductionism by denying absent qualia, and from Tye’s PANIC Representationalism by admitting qualia and inversion. Critics press each joint. Block (1980) rejects the argument against absent qualia; Kimble (2013) defends a broad perceptual model of introspection against the self-intimation thesis; McLaughlin (2009) finds unresolved tensions in the account of realization. The open question is whether appearance properties and realized qualia explain phenomenal character or redescribe it.
References
Block, N. (1980). Are absent qualia impossible? Philosophical Review, 89(2), 257–274.
Block, N., & Fodor, J. A. (1972). What psychological states are not. Philosophical Review, 81(2), 159–181.
Kimble, K. (2013). Inner sense and the broad perceptual model: A reply to Shoemaker. Synthesis Philosophica, 55–56(1–2), 245–262.
McLaughlin, B. P. (2009). Review of Sydney Shoemaker, Physical Realization. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, 2009.07.17.
Shoemaker, S. (1975). Functionalism and qualia. Philosophical Studies, 27, 291–315.
Shoemaker, S. (1980). Causality and properties. In P. van Inwagen (Ed.), Time and Cause (pp. 109–135). Reidel.
Shoemaker, S. (1981). Absent qualia are impossible—a reply to Block. Philosophical Review, 90, 581–599.
Shoemaker, S. (1982). The inverted spectrum. Journal of Philosophy, 79, 357–381.
Shoemaker, S. (1996). The First-Person Perspective and Other Essays. Cambridge University Press.
Shoemaker, S. (2000). Introspection and phenomenal character. Philosophical Topics, 28(2), 247–273.
Shoemaker, S. (2003). Content, character, and color. Philosophical Issues, 13, 253–278.
Shoemaker, S. (2007). Physical Realization. Oxford University Press.
Thompson, B. (2007). Shoemaker on phenomenal content. Philosophical Studies, 135(3), 307–334.