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Sapolsky’s Hard Incompatibilism

Neuroendocrinologist and biological anthropologist Robert Sapolsky counts himself as a “hard incompatibilist,” affirming the truth of determinism (i.e., all events and actions are the product of prior events and actions) and denying the existence of free will. There is no possibility, he says, “of reconciling our being biological organisms built on the physical rules of the universe with there being free will, a soul, a ‘Me’ inside there which is somehow free of biology.”

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Robert Sapolsky

Neuroendocrinologist, Primatologist & Professor

Robert Sapolsky is an American neuroendocrinologist, primatologist, and Professor of Biology, Neurology, and Neurosurgery at Stanford University, known for his research on stress, behavior, and the brain, as well as his influential books on neuroscience and human nature.

Key Takeaways

Core Claim
Free will is an illusion; all human actions are fully determined by biology and environment.
How It Works
Brain activity precedes conscious intention, making choice a post hoc story, not a cause.
Distinguishing Idea
Consciousness is not a driver of action, but a “hiccup” or emergent side effect of brain processes.
Reluctant Position
Admits bafflement at consciousness itself, calling it a “complex emergent property” that explains little.
Implications
Undermines moral responsibility; challenges law, ethics, and the notion of personal agency.

Sapolsky’s Hard Incompatibilism

Reluctant on Consciousness

Sapolsky's target is free will, not consciousness, but to deal with free will, he must deal with consciousness—after all, free will, if it exists, would be a product of consciousness, not the reverse.

But Sapolsky is a reluctant consciousness warrior. Introducing a section of his book labeled “What Is Consciousness?”, he enjoys some self-deprecation. “Giving this section this ridiculous heading,” he says, seemingly smiling, “reflects how unenthused I am about having to write this next stretch. I don't understand what consciousness is, can't define it. I can't understand philosophers' writing about it. Or neuroscientists', for that matter, unless it's ‘consciousness’ in the boring neurological sense, like not experiencing consciousness because you're in a coma” (Sapolsky, 2023a).

An Irrelevant Afterthought?

Referencing the Libet experiments (see “Epiphenomenalism (Materialism)”), which purport to dissociate conscious awareness from brain decision-making, Sapolsky argues that “three different techniques, monitoring the activity of hundreds of millions of neurons down to single neurons, all show that at the moment when we believe that we are consciously and freely choosing to do something, the neurobiological die has already been cast. That sense of conscious intent is an irrelevant afterthought.” In another context with another metaphor, he calls consciousness “an irrelevant hiccup” (Sapolsky, 2023a).

Yet Sapolsky is not prepared to dismiss consciousness as “just an epiphenomenon, an illusory, reconstructive sense of control irrelevant to our actual behavior.” This strikes me, he says, “as an overly dogmatic way of representing just one of many styles of neuroscientific thought on the subject” (Sapolsky, 2023a).

Beyond Understanding

Pushed to state what he believes consciousness is, Sapolsky demurs. “Consciousness is beyond me to understand—every few years I read a review from the people trying to understand it on a neurobiological level, and I cannot understand a word of what they are saying. For me, consciousness arises as a ‘complex emergent property’—which explains everything and nothing” (Sapolsky, 2023b).