Resch’s Platonic Functionalism

Computer scientist and inventor Jason Resch offers his theory of “Platonic Functionalism,” which posits consciousness, reality, and computation as deeply integrated at a fundamental level. In philosophy of mind, functionalism says it's how a mind works that matters, not what stuff it's made of. In philosophy of mathematics, Platonism says that mathematical objects have an independent existence. Functionalism and Platonism are both leading theories in their respective fields (PhilPapers Survey, 2020a, 2020b), but when they are taken together, Resch asserts, something extraordinary happens. The substrate-independence of functionalism, combined with the actual existence of all mathematical objects, leads to what he dubs “mathematical monism.”

Functionalism and Consciousness

Resch says, “If substrate doesn't matter, then whether a mind is made of something physical or something mathematical, makes no difference. The mind will be conscious so long as it supports the right functional relationships” (Resch, Forthcoming).

Resch mounts the following argument in favor of functionalism. When it comes to deciding whether functionalism is true, he says, we're faced with the following four propositions.

1. No computer program can emulate the human brain.
2. An emulation is possible, but it wouldn't be conscious.
3. The emulation would be conscious, but not in the same way. Or
4. The emulation would be conscious in exactly the same way.

We have cause to doubt (1) because all known physical laws are computable, and also because we have biologically accurate models of neurons that don't assume any exotic non-computable physics.

We have cause to doubt (2) because it makes consciousness into a pointless epiphenomenon, with no reason to evolve; furthermore, it makes scenarios like the zombie universe possible, wherein philosophers write books about consciousness without being conscious.

We have cause to doubt (3) because, as Chalmers shows, it would mean qualia could dance and fade without one noticing (Chalmers, 1995a), or, as Zuboff's partial visual cortex replacement argument shows, one could have inverted colors in half of their visual field without any impairment in function (Zuboff, 1994).

If we reject the first three possibilities, then only one option remains. We thereby conclude that an emulation of a human brain would not only be conscious but must be conscious in the exact same way as a functionally equivalent biological brain. Thus, Resch concludes, functional organization fully defines the character of both consciousness and qualia.

Mathematical Monism

Now for the Platonism. According to Resch, since the set of all mathematical objects includes every computation (Jones, 1978), it follows that among this set of all computations is a computation equivalent to a full simulation of the history of our universe, accurate to the detail of every particle interaction. Such a computation contains the full history of our universe, the formation of galaxies, the evolution of life, and the rise of civilization. It will also contain observers who, Resch argues, will be just as conscious as you and I: “They will talk about consciousness, write books about qualia and the hard problem, and even spend time reading articles about the mysteries of consciousness” (Resch, Forthcoming).

If functionalism is true, Resch says, these functional duplicates must be as conscious and self-aware as we are. But if there is no difference in consciousness between us, who exist physically, and our “computational doppelgängers,” who exist Platonically, who is to say we're not, ourselves, these computational doppelgängers? If we could be them, then any need to assume a separately existing physical world vanishes. Applying Occam's razor, we can drop the assumption of a separate physical world, and we're left with a monism based on Platonically existing computation.

This is a neutral monism in the full sense, as one neutral thing, computation, is the platform from which both physical realities and conscious minds emerge. Physical reality is, then, no longer the most fundamental thing but is rather a kind of emergent phenomenon. In this sense, mathematical monism has parallels to idealism (or other non-materialist theories), but unlike idealism, it comes with the constraint of computational consistency. This consistency means the typical experiences of observers will have a lawful order to them.

Mathematical monism breathes new life into Wheeler's concept of a participatory universe, in which information is considered the most fundamental thing (Wheeler, 1989), and where observers and their observed reality exist as a pair. This also seems to be the direction in which modern physics is heading. When the Nobel laureate physicist Frank Wilczek was asked where he thought physics would be in 100 years, he predicted, “The laws of physics will be reinterpreted as statements about information and its transformations.” He further added, “If physics evolves to describe matter in terms of information, as we discussed earlier, a circle of ideas will have closed. Mind will have become more matter-like, and matter will have become more mind-like” (Wilczek, 2016).

Empirical Evidence and Predictions

Resch maintains there is even empirical evidence in support of mathematical monism. He points to results by Bruno Marchal, Russell Standish, Markus Müller, and Stephen Wolfram, which show that starting from just one assumption, observer states are computationally generated, we can derive and predict many of the observed features of our universe, the character of physical law, and even the quantum mechanical nature of our reality.

For example:

• The logician and computer scientist Bruno Marchal showed that computationalism and arithmetical realism predict a physics with quantum logic, quantum indeterminacy, quantum non-locality, and an ontology of parallel states (Marchal, 2001).
• The computer scientist Russell Standish assumed observation within an infinite plenitude and showed he could derive the linearity of physical law, Occam's razor, and the Schrödinger equation (Standish, 2006).
• The quantum physicist Markus Müller detailed how algorithmic information theory predicts that most observers will find themselves in universes with time, a beginning, and governed by simple, computable, probabilistic laws (Müller, 2020).
• The computer scientist and physicist Stephen Wolfram details how all computations playing out in all possible ways explain why observers will see a universe with the second law of thermodynamics, general relativity, and quantum mechanics (Wolfram, 2021b).
• As Wolfram explains, “Does the observer 'create' the quantum mechanics? In some sense, yes. Just as in the spacetime case, the multiway graph has all sorts of computationally irreducible things going on. But if there's an observer with a coherent description of what's going on, then their description must follow the laws of quantum mechanics” (Wolfram, 2021b).

In Resch's view, that we can derive empirical consequences promotes mathematical monism, and its assumption of functionalism, into full-fledged testable and falsifiable scientific theories—not just ideas in pure philosophy. According to Marchal, “The quantum empirical clues happen to be serious hints that the physical emerges from an internally defined statistics on the numbers dreams or computations seen from inside” (Marchal, 2015). Resch writes, “The basic idea has been around since the time of Pythagoras, who said 'everything is number'. Now, through the lens of modern science, we finally have the means to test whether Pythagoras was right” (Resch, forthcoming).