Ney’s Physicalism, Not Scientism
Philosopher Alyssa Ney argues that consciousness can and should be understood within a physicalist framework, but physicalism should be informed by fundamental physics rather than by outdated or folk notions of “the physical.”
Alyssa Ney
Professor of Metaphysics
Alyssa Ney is Professor and Chair of Metaphysics in the Faculty of Philosophy, Philosophy of Science, and Religious Studies at LMU Munich. She focuses primarily on the unity of science, and the interpretation of quantum theories. She defends the claim that physics is metaphysically fundamental.
Key Takeaways
Core Claim
Consciousness is physical but not fundamental; it emerges from the physical world described by physics.
How It Works
Materialists trust science to eventually explain consciousness like it has other complex phenomena.
Distinguishing Idea
Disagreement with skeptics stems from differing views on what counts as a valid explanation.
Challenges & Tensions
dentity claims may seem brute or unintelligible—but all theories stop somewhere.
Philosophical Standoff
If you reject the scientific framework, materialist explanations will never satisfy.
Ney’s Physicalism, Not Scientism
Philosopher Alyssa Ney’s theory of consciousness is founded on her overall metaphysics espousing physicalism, the proposition that the world is simply the way physics says it is, but at the same time, she eschews scientism, which is (she quotes Susan Haack) a “kind of over-enthusiastic and uncritically deferential attitude towards science, an inability to see or an unwillingness to acknowledge its fallibility.” Ney argues that consciousness can and should be understood within a physicalist framework, but physicalism should be informed by fundamental physics rather than by outdated or folk notions of “the physical.” So, unlike traditional reductive physicalism, Ney says her approach is science-based and non-reductive (Ney, 2018).
Consciousness Within a Physicalist Framework
Ney maintains that consciousness is real and part of the physical fabric of the world, even if it currently resists reduction. “The physicalist should not be committed to reducing consciousness to something easily definable in current physics... but rather to the idea that it arises from or is realized by the physical.”
She is critical of dualism and anti-physicalist theories like Chalmers’ naturalistic dualism or panpsychism, which she sees as giving up too early on the scientific project. “We have no good reason to think that the methods of physics will not one day provide us with the tools to understand consciousness” (Ney, 2021).
Physicalism Without Scientism
Ney is careful when considering some physicalists who “adopt a strong scientistic attitude, and accordingly reject what is not mentioned by physics,” stating that “these physicalists go beyond what is required by physicalism.”
This is why, she says, “The reason why physicalism per se does not entail eliminativism about those entities or phenomena not mentioned by physics [i.e., consciousness] is made transparent by noting that more carefully formulated, physicalism is not a position merely about what exists, but rather about how the world is fundamentally” (Ney, 2018).
As physicalism is the view that the world is fundamentally the way physics says it is, one may accept this claim, Ney says, and “accept that physics does not mention spaghetti, [but] nonetheless accept its delicious existence.” The obvious reason, she says, is simply that “spaghetti does not exist fundamentally.”
She then goes for the close on consciousness. “The same applies for free will, intentionality, and consciousness. According to the physicalist, these are not fundamental phenomena” (Ney, 2018).
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