Nagasawa’s Mind-Body Problem in an Infinitely Decomposable Universe
Philosopher Yujin Nagasawa poses the disruptive idea: what would happen to the mind-body problem if there were no such thing as the deepest level of reality because the universe is infinitely decomposable? He argues that such a possibility would be devastating to theories of consciousness because it would undermine all traditional responses to the mind-body problem, such as physicalism, dualism, idealism, and neutral monism.
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Yujin Nagasawa
Professor of Philosophy
Yujin Nagasawa is a Japanese-born philosopher and Kingfisher College Chair of the Philosophy of Religion and Ethics at the University of Oklahoma. He previously served as president of the British Society for the Philosophy of Religion and is co-director of the John Hick Centre for Philosophy of Religion. Nagasawa is widely recognized for his contributions to debates on the nature and existence of God, as well as the philosophy of consciousness.
Key Takeaways
Core Claim
If reality has no smallest parts, all standard mind-body theories collapse as unfalsifiable and unstable.
How It Works
Infinite decomposability prevents locating a fundamental “bottom” level, undermining physicalism, dualism, idealism, and neutral monism.
Distinguishing Idea
Proposes “priority monism,” where the whole universe—not its parts—is the most fundamental entity.
Eastern Resonance
Aligns with some Eastern philosophies that see reality as an organic whole of entangled entities.
Philosophical Shift
Moves the search for fundamentality from the smallest components to the totality of existence itself.
Nagasawa’s Mind-Body Problem in an Infinitely Decomposable Universe
Philosopher Yujin Nagasawa poses the disruptive question of what would happen to the mind-body problem if there were no such thing as the deepest level of reality because the universe is infinitely decomposable? He argues that such a possibility would be devastating to theories of consciousness because it would undermine all traditional responses to the mind-body problem, such as physicalism, dualism, idealism, and neutral monism. Attempts to rescue physicalism from such an argument do not succeed, he argues, because “Physicalism (and any alternative to it) turns out to be an unfalsifiable, unverifiable, and unstable metaphysical view” (Nagasawa, 2012a).
However, “Their failures might motivate a unique form of monism that is radically different from physicalism as commonly formulated.” It leads to a “priority monism” because “It motivates us to seek fundamentality on the top, rather than on the bottom, level of reality.” The main difference between priority monism and traditional micro-fundamentalism, Nagasawa says, is “Priority monism regards the whole universe, rather than its ultimate components, as most fundamental. Locating the fundamental level at the top enables priority monism to secure a firm [if unusual] metaphysical ground”—because then, the totality of everything, including all that we call physical entities and mental entities, is the single fundamental entity, of which all of its components are derivative.
Nagasawa concedes that while what he has is truly a monism, with exactly one fundamental entity, it is neither physicalism nor dualism in the context of the mind-body problem. Rather, he suggests, it “has an affinity with monism in Eastern traditions, which regard the totality as an organic whole in which numerous entities are entangled” (Nagasawa, 2012b).
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