Mandik’s Qualia Quietism

Philosopher Pete Mandik introduces ‘qualia quietism’ to support an anti-realist theory of consciousness, labeled ‘neurofunctionalism,’ which integrates representationalism, self-representationalism, and neurobiological realism, aiming to naturalize phenomenal consciousness by tying it to brain-based representational structures. This is a naturalistic theory: phenomenal states are real, physical states in the brain with both causal powers and intentional content. But Mandik seeks to move beyond standard physicalism without veering into dualism or mysterianism (Mandik, 2016).

Beyond Realism and Eliminativism

Dismantling the predominating influence of ‘qualia’ is a cornerstone of Mandik’s argument, but he seeks to avoid “taking either of two oft-discussed sides in a debate that seems to be going nowhere. Those two sides are (1) Phenomenal realism, the view that qualia exist, and (2) qualia eliminativism, the view that qualia do not exist.”

Phenomenal realism, Mandik says, is espoused by “anyone who insists, along with Dave Chalmers, that consciousness poses a ‘hard problem.’” Qualia eliminativism is personified by Daniel Dennett (Dennett’s Illusionism) and Keith Frankish (Frankish’s Illusionism) (Mandik, 2025).

Mandik proposes what he has called “qualia realism without qualia”: a commitment to the reality of phenomenal experience without imparting any ontologically independent status to separate qualia. “Qualia, as traditionally conceived—intrinsic, ineffable, non-intentional properties—are at best unnecessary posits and at worst obstacles to progress in the scientific study of consciousness” (Mandik, 2001).

Here’s Mandik's early formulation of ‘qualia quietism:’

“[T]he view that the terms ‘qualia’, ‘phenomenal properties’, etc., lack sufficient content for anything informative to be said in either affirming or denying their existence. Affirming the existence of what? Denying the existence of what? Maintaining as illusory a representation of what? No comment. No comment. No comment” (Mandik, 2016).

While Mandik does not now reject that way of putting his view, he says he has “grown a bit dissatisfied with it,” because it sounds like he thinks that “even though many words have meanings, the word ‘qualia’ isn't one of them.” That is not his view: “I would hate to be interpreted as having the view that the word ‘qualia’ is somehow magically meaning-repellent…”

Mandik echoes Frankish in that “there are plenty of clear uses of ‘conscious’, ‘experience’, and ‘conscious experience’, uses that can be explicated in ‘weak’ and functional ways. And there’s plenty of work already done and still being done on consciousness so-construed.” But, Mandik stresses, “I see no future, illusionist or realist, for the term ‘qualia’ and its ilk” (Mandik, 2025).

Arguments for Quietism

Recognizing the challenges of arguing for the ‘excluded middle’ of qualia quietism, Mandik half-jokes, “It's mighty tempting to say there's NO argument for qualia quietism. It's an attitude. It's a lifestyle. It's a way of life. It's not the sort of thing that would be the conclusion of a deductive argument… But I resist temptation. I think there's a case to be made. Several cases, actually.” It’s not a proof, Mandik admits, more a ‘cumulative case’ argument.

The Case from Chaos: Descriptions of ‘qualia’ are “all over the map… Some think that they are properties of mental states, especially experiences. Some think they are the experiences themselves. Some think they are the objects of experiences, the things experienced. And some muddle-heads don't really know what they think” (Mandik, 2025).

The Case from Circularity: In critiquing illusionism, Mandik states that “‘qualia,’ ‘phenomenal character,’ ‘qualitative property,’ and ‘what-it's-like-ness’ just make a big dumb circle” (Mandik, 2016). In updating his thinking, he says, “the circularity of the ‘qualia’ term-circle isn't just a problem for illusionism. It is also a basis for recommending qualia quietism. Just say ‘no’ to those weird semi-technical terms that are just secret codes for one another.”

Mandik points out that the term ‘phenomenal,’ as used in contemporary philosophy of mind (i.e., ‘phenomenal consciousness’), is a technical term, without a direct analog in non-technical English. As such, he argues, “We have then, in place of an explicit definition of ‘phenomenal properties,’ a circular chain of interchangeable technical terms—a chain with very few links, and little to relate those links to non-technical terminology. The circle, then, is vicious. I’m skeptical that any properties seem ‘phenomenal’ to anyone because this vicious circle gives me very little idea what seeming ‘phenomenal’ would be.”

The Case from Alternatives: Mandik says, “There are so many alternatives to ‘qualia’ discourse that there's no good reason for not switching over to one or more of them.” He gives “a non-exhaustive list of alternative topics,” all spelled out in terms of “that beloved example, seeing an object as red (‘seeing red’ for short).” Here’s the list:

• “When one is in a mental state of seeing red, is one ever aware of properties of the state itself, as opposed to properties instantiated by extra-mental objects that are red?
• If one sees red partly in virtue of representing something as red, is the representing conceptual, non-conceptual, determinate, indeterminate, language-like, or picture-like?
• If one sees red, must one be a biological organism, or might one instead be an artifact created by biological organisms?
• If one sees red, is one thereby in a position to have justified beliefs (or some other epistemic state) that no one who's never seen red can have?” (Mandik, 2025).

Mandik’s primary point is that consciousness should be discussed and studied without the word ‘qualia.’

Neurofunctionalism and Representation

Intriguingly, Mandik asserts that he is not “just assuming physicalism,” and he affirms, “I'm not a physicalist.” He muses, “A qualia quietist could be a physicalist if they like. And being a qualia quietist may possibly drain all the life out of motivations for being an antiphysicalist. But I'm pretty sure I could be a substance dualist or self-identify as a Leibnizian monad and still make a case for qualia quietism” (Mandik, 2025).

Mandik’s quiet qualia supports his theory of neurofunctionalism, which seeks to account for consciousness in terms of brain-based representational and functional structures while rejecting certain metaphysical assumptions of traditional physicalism and functionalism. Whereas functionalism, classically, holds that mental states are defined by their causal roles, neurofunctionalism grounds these roles specifically in neural implementations.

Mandik supports a representational theory of consciousness, especially the intentionalist view, which holds that phenomenal states (what-it’s-like experiences) are determined by their representational content. “Conscious states are representational states whose phenomenal character is exhausted by their intentional content” (Mandik, 2005). This means that what it's like to experience red is fully explained by the brain representing red in a certain way, without the need for mysterious qualia.

Going further, Mandik also explores self-representationalism: the idea that conscious experiences are conscious because they represent themselves in some manner. “What makes an experience phenomenally conscious is that it includes, as part of its content, a representation of itself” (Mandik, 2005).

This reflexivity is not a special discovery of introspection, nor is it a separate act of introspection—Mandik rejects introspection as inherently unreliable and unscientific—but rather it is built into the representational structure of the conscious state itself. That is, consciousness is intrinsically self-representing.

Moreover, Mandik views consciousness as transparent: we are aware of the represented content (e.g., red apple), not the representation itself (e.g., neural pattern). He argues that the illusion of intrinsic qualia arises because when we introspect, we “look through” representations rather than at them. Thus, qualia are not discovered in introspection; they are constructed interpretations of our own representational mechanisms.

“The seeming qualitative immediacy of experience stems from the transparency of representational states: introspection doesn’t reveal qualia, but rather the represented properties” (Mandik, 2006). This supports Mandik’s rejection of qualia as intrinsic, nonphysical mental properties, and his advocacy of an anti-realist theory of consciousness founded on neurofunctionalism, representationalism, and self-representationalism.