Kammerer’s Introspective Illusionism

Philosopher François Kammerer defends an illusionist conception of phenomenal consciousness, “according to which phenomenal consciousness does not exist, but simply seems to exist.” He thinks that such a conception defends physicalism better than other more standard versions of physicalism. Moreover, he thinks that “the most popular defenses of physicalism against familiar anti-physicalist objections simply do not work” such that illusionism makes the best case, perhaps the only effectual case, for physicalism (Kammerer, 2025a).

Strong Illusionism

As Kammerer puts it. “Strong illusionists (or ‘eliminativists’) claim that phenomenal consciousness does not exist but seems to exist. For them, phenomenal states—phenomenal experiences of pain, visual phenomenal experiences of colors, emotional phenomenal experiences of joy, etc.—are not to be found anywhere in reality. Phenomenal properties (or qualia)—putative properties of phenomenal states in virtue of which they are phenomenal states of a certain kind—are never instantiated.

Strong illusionists concede that, while phenomenal states are not real, we usually believe that they are, notably because we introspectively represent them. Phenomenal consciousness is an illusion” (Kammerer, 2025b).

Kammerer recognizes that “Illusionism is a radically counter-intuitive thesis: it might even appear an incoherent thesis.” However, he says, “this apparent incoherence can itself be explained within an illusionist framework! A good theory of introspection will be able both to explain why consciousness seems to exist, even though it does not, and why we cannot make sense intuitively of the idea that consciousness does not exist, but merely seems to exist.”

But Kammerer asserts that “theories of introspection already available on the market are not equipped to do the job,” and he tries to develop, carefully, “a satisfying theory of introspection” (Kammerer, 2025a).

The TCE Theory of Introspection

Kammerer also recognizes that “It is the burden of a good illusionist theory to explain why the illusion of phenomenality is so peculiar.” It is no surprise that he thinks that “this is no trivial task.” He must and does present “a theory of phenomenal introspection which might be able to explain why the illusion of phenomenality is so unique.”

He calls this theory the TCE theory. “It states that phenomenal introspection, the specific process by which we come to form beliefs in a non-inferential way about our own phenomenal experiences, consists in the application of phenomenal concepts, which are Theoretically determined Concepts of Epistemologically special states (hence the acronym). According to TCE theory, there is an intimate connection between phenomenal introspection and our naïve epistemology, which is itself a part of our naïve theory of mind, in the sense that we systematically grasp phenomenal states as epistemologically special states.”

Kammerer argues that “this may explain why the illusion of phenomenality is so peculiar and so hard to contemplate as such” (Kammerer, 2019).

Consequences and Objections

Addressing the potential consequences if illusionism winds up being the true theory of consciousness (although consequentialism shouldn’t ever be the touchstone of truth), he says, “Illusionism might have normative consequences, that is, consequences regarding what has value. These consequences are not necessarily as gloomy as some people might think.”

Kammerer does not think that, if consciousness does not exist, then nothing has value, but he admits that “they can still be difficult to deal with” (Kammerer, 2025a).

It is no state secret that illusionism is subjected to various objections, the most influential being the idea that it is obviously false. Kammerer seems confident that he can answer these objections.

Opponents, he says, “think that they can reject illusionism, even if they conceded that it is coherent and supported by strong arguments. David Chalmers has articulated this reaction to illusionism in terms of a ‘Moorean’ argument against illusionism. This argument contends that illusionism is false, because it is obviously true that we have phenomenal experiences. I argue that this argument fails (or is dialectically irrelevant) by showing that its defenders cannot maintain that its crucial premise (properly understood) has the kind of support needed for the argument to work, without begging the question against illusionism” (Kammerer, 2022).