Jaworski’s Hylomorphism
Philosopher William Jaworski argues that the hard problem of consciousness arises only if hylomorphism is false. Hylomorphism is the claim that structure is a basic ontological and explanatory principle and is responsible for individuals being the kinds of things they are and having the powers or capacities they have.
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William Jaworski
Professor of Philosophy
William Jaworski is Associate Professor of Philosophy at Fordham University, specializing in the philosophy of mind. He received the ACPA Young Scholar Award in 2006.
Key Takeaways
Core Claim
Consciousness is a structured activity; its nature is explained by the form or organization of the body.
How It Works
Mental states arise from how physical parts are organized and coordinated, not just from the parts themselves.
Distinguishing Idea
Structure itself is a basic feature of reality, not reducible to matter or function.
Hard Problem Reframed
The mystery of consciousness only seems hard if we ignore structure as a fundamental principle.
Challenges & Tensions
Treating all structure as equally explanatory may oversimplify what makes consciousness distinct.
Jaworski’s Hylomorphism
Philosopher William Jaworski argues that the hard problem of consciousness arises only if hylomorphism is false. Hylomorphism is the claim that structure is a basic ontological and explanatory principle and is responsible for individuals being the kinds of things they are and having the powers or capacities they have. As Jaworski explains, “A human is not a random collection of physical materials, but an individual composed of physical materials with a structure that accounts for what it is and what it can do—the powers it has. What is true of humans is true of their activities as well.”
Structured activities, he says, include perceptual experiences, which means that everything about a perceptual experience, including its phenomenal character, can be explained by describing the perceiver's structure: perceptual subsystems, the powers of those subsystems, and the coordination that unifies their activities into the activity of the perceiver as a whole. Conscious experiences, Jaworski concludes, “thus fit unproblematically into the natural world—just as unproblematically as the phenomenon of life” (Jaworski, 2020).
According to Jaworski, from a hylomorphic perspective, “mind-body problems are byproducts of a worldview that rejects structure, and which lacks a basic principle which distinguishes the parts of the physical universe that can think, feel, and perceive from those that can't. Without such a principle, the existence of those powers in the physical world can start to look inexplicable and mysterious.” But if mental phenomena are structural phenomena, he says, then they are part of the physical world and thus “hylomorphism provides an elegant way of solving mind-body problems” (Jaworski, 2016).
While hylomorphism exemplifies a suite of arguments purporting to undermine the hard problem, its own challenge seems two-fold: (i) by defining structure as primitive and fundamental, it almost embeds the desired conclusion in the definitional premise; and (ii) by not distinguishing kinds of structure, all structure holds the same level of ultimate explanation, which may not fit consciousness.
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