Holmgren’s Grainy, Atomic Feels

Architect and consciousness discussant Jan Holmgren proposes that human conscious experiences are “grainy“ and they are built of discrete “atomic feels“ that emerge as microprocesses in our brains out of the continuous universe. Ultimately, he says, “large numbers of atomic feels ordered in rich spectra of qualities (qualia) are all there is to build knowledge from. A multitude of atomic feels form concepts that are stored in brains in the form of memory engrams” and form the foundation upon which concepts and abstract thought are constructed (Holmgren, 2017).

Atomic Feels and Grainy Consciousness

Thus, to Holmgren, all human knowledge is built from discrete conscious experiences, each grounded in the brain’s microprocesses. He argues that rather than arising from continuous processes alone, consciousness emerges from these rapid, localized activations—the “atomic feels“—that the brain integrates into coherent experiences. “Human conscious experiences are built out of numerous feels, each feel corresponding to the actualisation of one small, localised and shortly actualised microprocess in the brain” (Holmgren, 2014).

Holmgren takes much from Whitehead, especially his philosophy of organisms, where the universe is a dynamic system of interrelated processes and events, and the "graininess and atomic feels principles" (noted above). As Whitehead said, "In the place of the Hegelian hierarchy of categories of thought, the philosophy of organism finds a hierarchy of categories of feeling” (Whitehead, 1978).

As for qualia, Holmgren has them as ’feels and distributions’ in conceptual spaces. As such, traditional universals are replaced by ’feels and distributions,’ which structure conscious contents and their relations. Sensory qualia are generated internally. Sensory qualities are produced in brains rather than residing in the external world: “the experience of light is produced only within our brains; there are no light-qualia around other than in the brains of living organisms” (Holmgren, 2014).

Holmgren situates his theory within an evolutionary framework, asserting that human conscious experiences evolved to provide reliable interaction with a continuous, natural world (Holmgren, 2014). Taken together, his view emphasizes both the discreteness of consciousness and its integration within continuous natural processes.

Two distinctive features of Holmgren’s theory are the graininess of conscious experience and atomic feels as fundamental units.

• Discreteness within Continuity: Conscious experiences are discrete bursts of atomic feels actualized from a continuous process in the brain, each feel having a precise location and brief duration (Holmgren, 2017).
• Atomic Feels as Fundamental Units: Holmgren draws on Whitehead’s notion that “all our physical relationships are made up of such simple physical feelings, as their atomic bricks” (Whitehead, 1978).
• Universal Modality: While first evidenced in vision, Holmgren posits that similar graininess underlies all sensory modalities, emotions, and abstract thought—accounting for the detailed precision of human experience (Holmgren, 2017).

Holmgren’s graininess principle explains why conscious moments feel richly detailed yet temporally brief, resolving the apparent paradox between discrete experience and continuous brain dynamics (Maddocks et al., 2001). As Holmgren puts it: “Nature is continuous; experience is discrete.” This contrast underlies issues like binding and representation (Holmgren, 2014).

Holmgren’s theory connects atomic feels to the emergence of concepts through layers of abstraction. He follows Whitehead in viewing the universe as continuous behind consciousness but discrete at the level of actualized feels (Whitehead, 1978), which cluster into meaningful patterns—conceptual spaces—that form memories and abstract thought (Pereira & Almada, 2010). Each concept arises as a stable cluster of atomic feels stored in memory engrams (Tonegawa et al., 2015), enabling categorization and higher-order thinking (Holmgren, 2017).

Poles of Experience and Broader Ontology

Holmgren identifies two interdependent poles in human consciousness:

1. Objective Pole (sensory-driven): Involves direct input from senses, characterized by feels with deep evolutionary histories like color, sound, and touch (Bolhuis et al., 2014).
2. Subjective Pole (memory-driven): Involves internal engrams—stored clusters of feels that inform imagination, planning, and reflection (Tonegawa et al., 2015).

This dual-pole structure, Holmgren contends, aligns with Whitehead’s observation of consciousness as a “flickering” phenomenon with focal and penumbral regions (Whitehead, 1978).

Holmgren says that his theory is grounded in first-person phenomenology and empirical observation:

• Epistemic primacy of experience: Methodologically, all knowledge claims are grounded in experience: “All that we know comes to us through conscious experiences” (Holmgren, 2014).
• Waking Visual Experiences: Reports of rotating light voxels in a dark room upon awakening reveal the graininess of visual consciousness and suggest microprocess on–off dynamics (Holmgren, 2014).
• Cross-Modal Extension: Similar atomic-feel patterns occur in auditory experiments and abstract cognition (Holmgren, 2014).
• Evolutionary Consistency: The persistence of atomic feels across individuals and cultures, along with brain update rates (50–60 Hz in humans vs. higher in birds), supports a conserved evolutionary substrate (Azevedo et al., 2009; Maddocks et al., 2001).

For instantiating his theory in brain neurobiology, Holmgren suggests several neural substrates:

• Potential Memory Engrams: Identified by Tonegawa et al. (2015).
• Astrocytic Involvement: Pereira Jr. & Almada (2010) highlight human astrocytes’ unique role; Oberheim et al. (2009) describe their distinctive human characteristics.
• Distributed Microprocess Integration: Holistic brain circuits may coordinate the synchronization and actualization of feels (Holmgren, 2017).

Evolutionary Arguments and Multi-Aspect Monism

Holmgren reframes Dobzhansky’s dictum as “Everything in life makes sense in the light of evolution” (Holmgren, 2014). His evolutionary arguments include:

• Natural Selection of Feels: Atomic feels evolved for survival-critical resolution.
• Emergence of Conceptual Space: Evolution favored abstraction and culture (Bolhuis et al., 2014).
• Continuity and Discreteness: Evolution shaped continuous brain processes that underlie discrete conscious events (Holmgren, 2017), positioning consciousness as adaptive and evolutionarily grounded.

This perspective situates consciousness as an adaptive outcome of evolutionary pressures, intertwining macro-scale organismal success with adapting microprocess mechanisms.

Holmgren’s consciousness ontology goes beyond traditional physicalist and dualist frameworks by advocating Multi-Aspect Monism, where reality is understood through multiple interrelated perspectives (Holmgren, 2014). He critiques Triple-Aspect Monism—which balances physical-chemical, informational, and mental levels (Pereira, 2013)—arguing that it remains too narrow for capturing the full scope of human consciousness. Multi-Aspect Monism instead encourages consideration of scientific, cultural, and spiritual aspects, reflecting human creativity and diversity of experience. This inclusive stance emphasizes that consciousness cannot be reduced to a single scientific domain and must be studied through interdisciplinary lenses.

Holmgren’s challenge: “Physics should no longer be considered the ideal for all other sciences. At least equally important is the understanding of human behaviour.” This attitude exemplifies Multi-Aspect Monism (Holmgren, 2017).