Hacker’s Skepticism

Philosopher Peter Hacker is deeply skeptical of the entire theories of consciousness project; he would pull down the entire edifice. To Hacker, consciousness is not a “thing” or a “substance”; it is not to be reified. To imagine consciousness as an object or entity in the brain is to make a category mistake. According to Hacker, consciousness is not something one has (like an arm or neurochemicals) but rather a conceptual framework we use to describe certain human capacities, experiences, and behaviors. He argues that “consciousness” is not a unitary phenomenon that can be isolated or explained by neuroscience. Instead, it refers to a complex array of capacities and states—like perception, thought, emotion, intention, and self-awareness. These are logically interconnected and rooted in human behavior and language use.

Consciousness as Conceptual, Not a Thing

Following Wittgenstein, Hacker argues that psychological predicates (like “knowing,” “feeling pain,” “being conscious”) apply to human beings as persons, not to their parts (such as the brain) or sub-personal mechanisms. Consciousness is thus a property of the person, not the nervous system. Hacker says, “To be conscious is not to be in a particular state; it is to be a certain kind of being—a human being, a sentient animal. There is no such thing as consciousness over and above the various forms of consciousness” (Hacker, 2013).

Rejection of the Hard Problem and Qualia

Hacker dismisses the framing of consciousness in terms of the so-called “hard problem” because, he says, the problem arises only because of misguided assumptions about how language and mind work. Again, following Wittgenstein, he argues that many philosophical problems, like consciousness, are not factual puzzles but conceptual tangles—problems created by misusing language or misdirected grammatical categories.

Thus, those who pose or are troubled by the hard problem are muddled, he says, because they treat consciousness and experience as inner things or phenomena that somehow must be generated by the brain. They look for causal explanations of something that is not a thing or event, and therefore a “cause” makes no sense.

Consciousness is not something that happens in the brain—it’s a way of talking about how people experience, think, perceive, and feel. Hacker puts it bluntly, “There is no such thing as the ‘hard problem of consciousness’. The so-called problem arises from a series of conceptual confusions, which make it seem as if there is a problem to solve” (Bennett & Hacker, 2003).

Regarding qualia, our felt inner experience—which is the core conundrum eliciting the hard problem—Hacker maintains that subjectivity (what-it-is-like) is built into our grammar and practices for using words like feel, see, believe, etc. It is not something that needs to be explained mechanistically. He makes the point that saying, “I feel pain” or “I see red” already implies subjective experience, and there is no additional “thing” (qualia) needing a further “bridging” explanation between physical and phenomenal states. Thus, for Hacker, the hard problem’s demand to explain qualia doesn’t make sense. It assumes we need to bridge a gap between brain states and mind states, but there is no such gap needed to be bridged.

In summary, to Hacker, consciousness is not a puzzle for science to solve. It’s a set of human capacities and conceptual frameworks that we misunderstand when we reify them and ask meaningless metaphysical questions. Put simply, the hard problem is not “hard.” It’s not even a real problem—it’s a philosophical confusion masquerading as a scientific or metaphysical mystery.

Hacker also rejects the supposed explanatory power of neuroscience, which, he claims, cannot answer philosophical questions about consciousness because they are conceptual, not empirical. Instead, we should understand that neuroscience tells us how the brain enables perception and behavior, while philosophy clarifies how experience is structured in our practices and language (Bennett & Hacker, 2003).