Fish’s Naïve Realism

Philosopher William Fish’s theory of consciousness is grounded in naïve realism, also known as relationalism. This perspective posits that conscious experiences are direct relations to external, mind-independent objects and their properties, rather than internal representations or constructions. Fish asserts that in veridical perception—when our sensory experiences accurately reflect the external world—the phenomenal character of experience is constituted by the external objects themselves. For instance, when perceiving a red apple, the redness experienced is not a mental construct but is identical to the redness of the apple in the world. This view emphasizes that the external world “literally shapes the contours of our conscious experiences” (Cailes et al., 2021).

To account for non-veridical experiences like hallucinations and illusions, Fish employs disjunctivism. This approach maintains that veridical and non-veridical experiences are fundamentally different in nature. While veridical experiences involve direct relations to actual objects, hallucinations do not; they lack the relational component that characterizes genuine perception. This distinction allows for a consistent explanation of various perceptual phenomena without resorting to representational theories (Fish, 2009).

How does naïve realism deal with the phenomenology of memory and imagination? Fish explores the application of naïve realism beyond immediate perception, particularly concerning episodic memory. He considers two possibilities: treating memory experiences as involving direct acquaintance with past events or viewing them as derivative of perceptual acquaintances or experiences. Fish tentatively supports the latter, suggesting that the phenomenology of memory is inherited from prior perceptual experiences, even if the original objects are no longer present (Fish, 2022).

Fish takes on the “hard problem” of consciousness and “the explanatory gap between functional and phenomenal facts.” He proposes that adopting a relationalist perspective can bridge the explanatory gap. By viewing phenomenal properties as relational rather than intrinsic, he says that we can begin to formulate a naturalistic theory of consciousness that aligns with our intuitive understanding of experience. He argues that “if we supplement the functionalist stories with a relationalist conception of phenomenal properties, we can begin to see the shape of a naturalistic theory of phenomenal consciousness that will provide intuitively compelling responses to these problems“ (Fish, 2008).