Fedotov's Communication Hypothesis of Consciousness

Neurobiologist Sergei Fedotov proposes a “Communication Hypothesis” in which consciousness is a highly specialized brain function that enables the encoding of personal information into communicative messages (Fedotov and Baidyuk, 2023). Consciousness can be viewed as an evolutionary improvement in information gathering and decision-making that makes personal motives and intentions publicly available and enables the directed modification of others' motives and intentions by communicating new information.

On a subjective level, awareness of mental images signifies the readiness of information to be transmitted to an interlocutor. The Communication Hypothesis allows us to determine the position of conscious processes in relation to other cognitive processes, such as sensory detection, decision-making, and emotions. Consciousness can influence only those components of behavior that are related to the transmission of messages between people(Fedotov and Baidyuk, 2023).

According to Fedotov, the emergence of consciousness is therefore inseparable from the development of language in culture. From this perspective, consciousness is an ability of social organisms that develops during ontogeny through the acquisition of language. Consciousness is not an inherited trait or property of an individual (personal communication, 2025).

Animals are capable of learning sign language and of using names (King and Janik, 2013; Patterson and Cohn, 1990). According to the communication hypothesis, the use of language by individual anthropoids clearly indicates consciousness in such individuals. However, the development of consciousness in dolphins remains questionable, as it has not yet been proven that the signals used are shared by all members of the pod and are acquired words unique to specific groups ( ).

According to the Communication Hypothesis:

1. Thinking is the process of forming a thought, that is, an image associated with a message.
2. Conscious processes of message creation can be stored in the form of declarative memory.
3. Emotions may be unconscious, but they usually have a mental representation and are encoded in messages in consciousness.
4. Self-consciousness is awareness of the independent cognitive process of self-identification in collective actions (physical boundaries and intentions of the subject and other participants).

Observation and interpretation of known experiments with consciousness in the context of the Communication Hypothesis

Observation: Conscious intention to make a movement occurs 300 ms after the onset of the readiness potential. Interpretation: Message encoding always follows goal-directed behavior (Libet et al., 1983).

Observation: Conscious perception integrates stimuli presented within 400 ms. Interpretation: Coding in consciousness occurs in portions to form a relevant, holistic, and reliable message (Drissi-Daoudi et al., 2019).

Observation: The priming effect disappears when the interval between the primary (unconscious) and target (conscious) stimuli is changed. Interpretation: Consciousness reflects a pattern acquired unconsciously, and there are thresholds for conscious processes (Naccache et al., 2002).

Observation: Blind-sighted people are not aware of objects, but can visually determine their position and properties in experiments on attention. Interpretation: Message encoding in consciousness can be decoupled from other cognitive processes such as sensory and motor processing (Kentridge et al., 2004).

Observation: The formation of the first memories in children coincides with the onset of speech development at the age of two years. Interpretation: Declarative memory is the storage of messages encoded through language in consciousness (MacDonald et al., 2000; Peterson, Rideout, 1998; Simcock, Hayne, 2002).

Observation: People whose cultures lack the concepts of blue shades perform tasks to distinguish these colors more slowly and less successfully. Interpretation: Coding of messages in consciousness is associated with the improvement of sensory and motor stereotypes (Roberson et al., 2000; He et al., 2019).

Observation: Tasks with spatial manipulation of images in mind are accompanied by inner speech and covert articulation. Interpretation: Subjective mental images in consciousness are formed in the process of generating messages (Sokolov, 1972).

Observation: People with split hemispheres can correctly select objects with their left hand, the name or image of which is presented in the left visual field, but are not able to name (recognize) the selected object. Interpretation: The right hemisphere visually identifies the object and tactilely recognizes the object, but is not aware of it, since awareness is probably provided by the left hemisphere, encoding the message (Sperry, 1984).

Observation: Anthropoids, elephants, whales, crows, fishes, and ants can pass the mirror self-recognition test, which is a key indicator of self-awareness, a component of consciousness. Interpretation: Detecting and manipulating a spot invisibly applied to the body in a mirror is the result of learning the nature of the mirror as a reflector of objects in front of it, and associating mirror reflection with tactile and proprioceptive sensitivities. The mirror test is not associated with the encoding of messages in consciousness (Gallup, 1970; Chang et al., 2017; Kohda et al., 2019).

Observation: Individuals with split-brain disorders could pronounce a word presented in the right visual field unconsciously. Repetition of a conversation of a partner's speech, in both normal and pathological conditions, can occur unconsciously or against the background of extraneous thoughts. Interpretation: The formation of messages in consciousness can occur independently of the pronunciation and understanding of speech, as a result of which these processes can be separated in norm and pathology (Gazzaniga et al., 1987; Ganos et al., 2012; Suzuki et al., 2012).

Observation: In Maier’s “two cord puzzle, subjects associated their decisions with events unrelated to the experimenter's prompts. Interpretation: Information about the reasons for decisions is projected into consciousness in the form of messages, taking into account the social context (Custers & Aarts, 2010; Nisbett & Wilson, 1977).

References

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