Chalmers’s Panpsychism

Panpsychism's renaissance can be attributed, at least in part, to philosopher David Chalmers, who has long entertained panpsychism as a possibly viable theory of consciousness (Chalmers, 1996, 2007, 2014a, 2014b, 2016c). “To find a place for consciousness within the natural order,” he wrote, “we must either revise our conception of consciousness, or revise our conception of nature” (Chalmers, 2003). This sentence prepares the way, as it were, because if one is unwilling to deflate consciousness (as a kind of illusion), then one has no choice but to expand nature.

Early Engagement with Panpsychism

In his early work, Chalmers raised panpsychism, tentatively, in the context of his kind of dualism. “I resisted mind-body dualism for a long time, but I have now come to the point where I accept it, not just as the only tenable view but as a satisfying view in its own right. It is always possible that I am confused, or that there is a new and radical possibility that I have overlooked; but I can comfortably say that I think dualism is very likely true. I have also raised the possibility of a kind of panpsychism. Like mind-body dualism, this is initially counterintuitive, but the counterintuitiveness disappears with time. I am unsure whether the view is true or false, but it is at least intellectually appealing, and on reflection it is not too crazy to be acceptable” (Chalmers, 1996; Doyle, n.d.a.).

While Chalmers's initial considerations of panpsychism were perhaps motivated by a “when-all-else-fails” perspective, his more recent papers address complex philosophical issues inherent in panpsychism (Chalmers, 2013).

Chalmers divides the most important views on the metaphysics of consciousness “almost exhaustively into six classes,” three involving broadly reductive views, “seeing consciousness as a physical process that involves no expansion of a physical ontology,” and three involving broadly nonreductive views, “on which consciousness involves something irreducible in nature, and requires expansion or reconception of a physical ontology.” Chalmers's sixth class embeds panpsychism^[1] (Chalmers, 2003).

Panpsychism, more formally, is the theory that “consciousness is constituted by the intrinsic properties of fundamental physical entities: that is, by the categorical bases of fundamental physical dispositions. On this view, phenomenal or protophenomenal properties are located at the fundamental level of physical reality, and in a certain sense, underlie physical reality itself” (Chalmers, 2003).

Toward Russellian Monism

In one line of argument, channeling Hegel, Chalmers starts with the thesis of materialism and the antithesis of dualism, and reaches the synthesis of panpsychism. This synthesis encounters the antithesis of panprotopsychism, from which he reaches the new synthesis of Russellian monism. This synthesis encounters the new antithesis of the combination problem, and whether there can be a new synthesis, Chalmers avers, remains an open question.

Still, he argues that there is “good reason to take both panpsychism and panprotopsychism very seriously,” and he concludes boldly: “If we can find a reasonable solution to the combination problem for either, this view would immediately become the most promising solution to the mind-body problem” (Chalmers, 2016a).

Chalmers has explored all the major non-materialism theories, including Quantum Theories (Chalmers and McQueen, 2022) and Idealism (Chalmers, 2020d) as well as Panpsychism, not wholly committing to any one. Although he favors Panpsychism, he recognizes its problems (Chalmers, 1996, 2007, 2014a, 2014b, 2016c).

Footnote

[1]. The sixth class is labeled “Monism,” which means only one of a kind of fundamental stuff, a stuff with both phenomenal and physical properties (Chalmers, 2003).