Bhartṛhari’s Linguistic Idealism

Bhartṛhari (probably 5th century CE), through his seminal text Vākyapadīyam (VP) (“On the Sentence and the Word”), integrates language and metaphysics to formulate a unique theory of consciousness, which can be called Linguistic Idealism (Śabdādvaita) (Iyer, 1965). It posits that ultimate conscious reality is one indivisible linguistic principle (śabda tattva) [1] (Staal 1976:123; Matilal 1990:125; Ferrante 2017:242). According to this theory (as explained by Sanskrit scholar Rahul Kumar), language (śabda [2]) is not merely a tool for communication but the substance of which the universe is made (Vergiani, 2017) [3]. One of the explanations of this radical view is that the reality we perceive is an interpreted reality, and this “interpretation invariably in terms of some language or other” (Matilal 1990:124). Bhartṛhari explains three forms of language in VP 1.142, which he calls “Knots of Consciousness”: Vaikharī (“the audible and articulated language”), the Madhyamā (“inaudible one”), and the Paśyantī (“the unitary and inner one in which every kind of differentiation is lost”) [4] (Ferrante 2020:242). In addition, the Vedic tradition also mentions a fourth level of speech called Parā (the Supreme). Some scholars argued that this Parā, corresponding to pure consciousness (cit), is none other than Śabda-Brahman (the Linguistic-Absolute) itself (Ferrante 2020:242).

The Śabda-Brahman (the Linguistic-Absolute) is the metaphysical foundation on which Bhartṛhari’s theory of consciousness is built, as described in VP 1.1. “The Brahman who is without beginning or end, whose very essence is the Word, who is the cause of the manifested phonemes, who appears as the objects, from whom the creation of the world proceeds.” Bhartṛhari, in his auto commentary (svopajña-vṛtti) of VP 1.11 [5], mentions Śabda-Brahman for the first time, which implies that the Brahman, whose very essence is the Word (language) (VP 1.1), is none other than Śabda-Brahman. On the account of epistemology, Bhartṛhari’s theory of consciousness rests on the inseparable relationship between language, cognition, and self-awareness. According to Vergiani (2017), consciousness, whose fundamental nature is language, is like “connective tissue underlying all the cognitions of individual subjects” and always implies self-awareness, as is noted in VP 1.126 [6]. “The consciousness of all beings going through transmigration is in the nature of the word; it exists within and without. The consciousness of all types of beings does not go beyond this essence.”

To begin with cognition, Bhartṛhari explicitly states that there is no cognition without language [7] (Staal 1976:122). “There is no cognition in the world in which the word does not figure. All knowledge is, as it were, intertwined with the word.” Aklujkar (2000) highlights the three key entities, from the perspective of consciousness, in Bhartṛhari’s theory of cognition: sentience or pure consciousness (cit, citi, or caitanya), determinate consciousness or intellect or cognizer (buddhi), and the state, act, or event of cognizing (jñāna). Notably, he posits that there exists no physical and material distinction between intellect (buddhi) and pure consciousness (cit, citi, or caitanya) (Aklujkar, 2000). Additionally, consciousness is never separated from self-awareness, the cognition of ‘I am’ (ahamasmīti), and is considered innate, linguistic, and eternal, as elaborated in the auto commentary (svopajña-vṛtti) of VP 1.41 [8] (Vergiani, 2017). For Bhartṛhari, the distinction between self (subject denoted by first-person verb forms) and non-self (object denoted by second-person verb forms) is inherently grammatical (Vergiani, 2017).

Based on the above discussion, according to Kumar, scholars claim that Bhartṛhari is one of the most influential and original figures in the history of Indian philosophy, since he originally advocates that language is the fundamental structure that constitutes reality, knowledge, and self-awareness. By “originally,” Kumar means the philosophers of the Pratyabhijñā (“Recognition”) school of Kashmir Shaivism (c. 9th-10th centuries CE), who also believe that “consciousness is unconceivable without language,” simply borrowed “Bhartṛhari’s work without any substantial modification” (Ferrante 2020:139-142). Additionally, Bhartṛhari holds that the world is the transformation of language [9] (cf. Staal 1976:123). This transformation is real (pariṇāma, as mentioned in verse 1.120), not an illusion (vivarta or māyā), unlike later Śaṅkara's Advaita Vedanta (c. 750). The Pratyabhijñā (Recognition) school of Kashmir Shaivism also doesn’t follow the aforementioned distinction of reality (Ferrante 2020:136). Presumably, they have borrowed this notion from Bhartṛhari’s work as well. Further, Bhartṛhari's Absolute is qualified by language (Śabda-Brahman), unlike Śaṅkara's Absolute (Brahman), which is attributeless or non-qualified. In sum, Bhartṛhari’s uncompromising non-dualism occupies a unique position not only within Indian philosophy but also across the broader landscape of theories of consciousness.

Footnotes

^[1]anādinidhanaṃ brahma śabdatattvaṃ yadakṣaram | vivartate'rthabhāvena prakriyā jagato yataḥ || Vākyapadīyam, 1.1 ||

^[2] In Indian philosophical tradition, the term ‘śabda’ is interchangeably used to refer to sound, word, sentence, speech and language in general.

^[3]śabdasya pariṇāpo'yamityāmnāyavido viduḥ | chandobhya eva prathamametadviśvaṃ vyavartata || Vākyapadīyam, 1.120 ||

^[4] vaikharyā madhyamāyāśca paśyantyāścaitadadbhutam | anekatīrthabhedāyāstrayyā vācaḥ paraṃ padam|| Vākyapadīyam, 1.120 ||

^[5]āsannaṃ brahmaṇastasya tapasāmuttamaṃ tapaḥ | prathamaṃ chandasāmaṅgamāhurvyākaraṇaṃ budhāḥ || Vākyapadīyam, 1.11 ||

^[6] saiṣā saṃsāriṇāṃ saṃjñā bahirantaśca vartate | tanmātrāmavyatikrāntaṃ caitanyaṃ sarvajātiṣu || Vākyapadīyam, 1.26 ||

^[7] na so'sti pratyayo loke yaḥ śabdānugamādṛte | anuviddhamiva jñānaṃ sarvaṃ śabdena bhāsate|| Vākyapadīyam, 1.123 ||

^[8]caitanyamiva yaścāyamavicchedena vartate | āgamastamupāsīno hetuvādairna bādhyate || Vākyapadīyam, 1.141 ||

^[9]śabdasya pariṇāpo'yamityāmnāyavido viduḥ | chandobhya eva prathamametadviśvaṃ vyavartata || Vākyapadīyam, 1.120 ||